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OVERGENERALIZATION OF THE HOT PURSUIT
DOCTRINE PROVIDES ANOTHER BLOW TO THE FOURTH
AMENDMENT IN MIDDLETOWN V. FLINCHUM†
It is a ‘basic principle of Fourth Amendment law’ that searches and
seizures inside a home without a warrant are presumptively
unreasonable.*

I. INTRODUCTION
Unreasonable searches of the home have often been regarded as a
serious infringement upon one’s right to privacy.1 The right to privacy
is currently recognized by a variety of governments and has existed for
hundreds of years.2 Although the Constitution does not grant an express
right to privacy,3 the Supreme Court has consistently acknowledged the

†

Middletown v. Flinchum, 765 N.E.2d 330 (Ohio 2002).
Payton v. New York, 445 U.S. 573, 586 (1980).
1. James G. Sotos, Despite Lack of Warrant, Arrest Was Proper: Court, CHI. DAILY L.
BULL., Oct. 20, 1994, at 6 (“The adage ‘A man’s home is his castle’ perhaps best explains why
constitutional protections against the long arm of the law are at their greatest when the police
attempt to intrude on the sanctity of the home.”). Stanley H. Friedelbaum, The Quest for Privacy:
State Courts and an Elusive Right, 65 ALB. L. REV. 945 (2002) (discussing right of privacy as
interpreted and applied to States).
2. David Banisar, Privacy and Human Rights, an International Survey of Privacy Laws and
Practice, Global Internet Liberty Campaign, available at http://www.gilc.org/privacy/survey/intro.
html (last visited Feb. 3, 2003). In discussing the origins of the right to privacy the author noted:
The law of privacy can be traced as far back as 1361, when the Justices of the Peace Act
in England provided for the arrest of peeping toms and eavesdroppers. In 1765, British
Lord Camden, striking down a warrant to enter a house and seize papers wrote, “We can
safely say there is no law in this country to justify the defendants in what they have
done; if there was, it would destroy all the comforts of society, for papers are often the
dearest property any man can have.”
Id. (quoting Entick v. Carrington, 1558-1774 All E.R. Rep. 45 (K.B. 1765)).
3. See generally Adam Hickey, Between Two Spheres: Comparing State and Federal
Approaches to the Right to Privacy and Prohibitions Against Sodomy, 111 YALE L.J. 993 (2002)
(discussing relationship between homosexuals’ right to privacy and sodomy laws); Tracie B.
Loring, An Analysis of the Informational Privacy Protection Afforded by the European Union and
the United States, 37 TEX. INT’L L.J. 421 (2002) (comparing European information privacy laws to
those of the United States).
*
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rights of personal privacy and zones of privacy.4 Affording extra
protection to the home seems to show that our right to privacy is at its
peak behind closed doors.5
Unfortunately, the list of exceptions to the warrant requirement is
6
large and continuously growing.7 These exceptions will undoubtedly
infringe upon our right to privacy and further erode Fourth Amendment
protections.8 Some scholars feel that liberal interpretations of such
exceptions will eventually eliminate the objectives behind the Fourth
Amendment.9 For example, increasing the number of exceptions to the
4. See, e.g., Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 152-53 (1973). Justice Blackmun acknowledged:
The Constitution does not explicitly mention any right of privacy. In a line of decisions,
however . . . the Court has recognized that a right of personal privacy, or a guarantee of
certain areas of zones of privacy, does exist under the Constitution. In varying contexts,
the Court or individual Justices have, indeed, found at least the roots of that right in the
First Amendment . . .; in the Fourth and Fifth Amendments . . . in the penumbras of the
Bill of Rights . . .; in the Ninth Amendment . . . or in the concept of liberty guaranteed by
the first section of the Fourteenth Amendment.
Id. (citations omitted), quoted in Alain A. Levasseur, Legitimacy of Judges, 50 AM. J. COMP. L. 43,
81 (2002) (discussing theoretical approaches to the legitimacy of the judicial branch).
5. See, e.g., United States v. U.S. Dist. Ct. E.D. Mich., 407 U.S. 297, 313 (1972) (stating
“physical entry of the home is the chief evil against which the wording of the Fourth Amendment is
directed.”), cited with approval in Payton, 445 U.S. at 585-86.
6. See Jeffrey Haningan Kuras et al., Warrantless Searches and Seizures, 90 GEO. L.J. 1130
(2002) (providing a list of recognized exceptions to the warrant requirement).
7. Sherri Schuck, Letting the End Justify the Means: The Continuing Dissolution of the
Fourth Amendment’s Requirement for Search Warrants, 40 WASHBURN L.J. 350 (2001) (discussing
expansion of the exception by allowing courts to continue to determine exigent circumstances with
a variety of factors); Darrel C. Waugh, Note, Constitutional Law-Developing Guidelines in Fourth
Amendment “Clothing Cases” After United States v. Butler, 16 W. NEW ENG. L.REv. 289, 292
(1994) (providing background of the large amount of exceptions to the warrant rule).
8. See generally Kuras, supra note 6. The author explained how the warrant requirement
can be avoided with the following exceptions:
There are, however, many exceptions to the probable cause and warrant requirements,
including investigatory detentions, warrantless arrests, searches incident to a valid arrest,
seizure of items in plain view, exigent circumstances, consent searches, vehicle searches,
container searches, inventory searches, border searches, searches at sea, administrative
searches, and searches in which the special needs of law enforcement make the probable
cause and warrant requirements impracticable.
Id. Thomas Y. Davies, Denying a Right by Disregarding Doctrine: How Illinois v. Rodriguez
Demeans Consent, Trivializes Fourth Amendment Reasonableness, and Exaggerates the
Excusability of Police Error, 59 TENN. L. REV. 1 (1991) (discussing the Supreme Court’s
willingness to disregard settled doctrine while expanding exceptions to the Fourth Amendment).
9. Emily Sovell, Note, State v. Hanson: Has the Exigent Circumstances Exception to the
Warrant Requirement Swallowed the Rule?, 45 S.D. L. REV. 163 (2000) (criticizing the South
Dakota Supreme Court’s determination relative to exigent circumstances in State v. Hanson). See
generally John Barnoski, Note, Fourth Amendment – Knock-and-Announce Rule – Common Law
“Knock and Announce” Principle forms Part of Reasonableness Inquiry Under Fourth Amendment
Wilson v. Arkansas, 6 SETON HALL CONST. L.J. 1231 (1996) (arguing recent decisions concerning
the Fourth Amendment have been ambiguous and have failed to adequately protect our Fourth
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warrant rule provides a greater chance for police error, bias, and abuse,
thus escalating unreasonable searches and invasions of privacy.10
Requiring members of the judicial branch to determine probable cause
reduces the chance of unreasonable searches because a neutral individual
is less likely to suffer from partiality.11 Therefore, to protect our right to
privacy the Supreme Court has found that exceptions to the warrant
requirement are carefully constructed and few in number.12
The Ohio Supreme Court held that hot pursuit of a suspect qualifies
as an exigent circumstance regardless of the underlying offense.13
Unfortunately, this holding increases the number of exceptions to the

Amendment rights); Phyllis Bookspan, Reworking the Warrant Requirement: Resuscitating the
Fourth Amendment, 44 VAND. L. REV. 473 (1991) (arguing lack of coherent guidelines have
widdled away the Fourth Amendment); Adina Schwartz, Homes as Folding Umbrellas: Two Recent
Supreme Court Decisions on “Knock and Announce,” 25 AM. J. CRIM. L. 545 (1998) (arguing
recent attempts by the Supreme Court to define the home have resulted in considerable erosion of
Fourth Amendment protections); but see Crystal Cunningham, Domestic Violence: I Don’t Need to
Have Bruises to Feel Pain, A Worthy Exception to the Warrant Requirement, 28 PAC. L.J. 731
(1997) (arguing exigent circumstance should be created to deal with domestic violence); cf. Steven
W. Skinner, Note, Search and Seizure – Warrants - Police Officers Acting Pursuant to an Arrest
Warrant May Pursue a Fleeing Suspect into a Private Residence and Forcibly Enter the Dwelling
Without Knowing the Underlying Offense of the Warrant and Without First Knocking and
Announcing Their Presence State v. Jones, 26 SETON HALL L. REV. 1736 (1996) (arguing hot
pursuit doctrine is needed to prevent the hampering of police duties).
10. See Robert J. Driscoll, Unannounced Police Entries and Destruction of Evidence after
Wilson v. Arkansas, 29 COLUM. J.L. & SOC. PROBS. 1 (1995) (discussing rash of police raids after
no knock rule). See also Matthew Hess, Comment, Good Cop-Bad Cop: Reassessing the Legal
Remedies for Police Misconduct, 1993 UTAH L. REV. 149 (1993) (discussing civil and criminal
remedies available for police misconduct).
11. Johnson v. United States, 333 U.S. 10, 13-14 (1948). In discussing the rationale behind
their decision the Court noted:
The point of the Fourth Amendment, which often is not grasped by zealous officers, is
not that it denies law enforcement the support of the usual inferences which reasonable
men draw from evidence. Its protection consists in requiring that those inferences be
drawn by a neutral and detached magistrate instead of being judged by the officer
engaged in the often competitive enterprise of ferreting out crime.
Id.
12. Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 357 (1967) (“[S]earches outside the judicial process,
without prior approval by judge or magistrate, are per se unreasonable under the Fourth
Amendment . . . subject only to a few specifically established and well-delineated exceptions.”)
(footnote omitted). But see Thomas Y. Davies, Denying a Right by Disregarding Doctrine: How
Illinois v. Rodriguez Demeans Consent, Trivializes Fourth Amendment Reasonableness, and
Exaggerates the Excusability of Police Error, 59 TENN. L. REV. 1 (1991) (discussing the Supreme
Court’s willingness to disregard settled doctrine while expanding exceptions to the Fourth
Amendment); Silas Wasserstrom, The Court’s Turn toward a General Reasonableness
Interpretation of the Fourth Amendment, 27 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 119 (1989) (interpreting Supreme
Court decisions in the Warren and Burger eras to have severely limited the power of the Fourth
Amendment).
13. Id.
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warrant rule without any corresponding justification.14 This Note will
explore the Ohio Supreme Court’s reasoning and discuss potential
problems created by failing to establish a buffer zone for interpretations
of exigent circumstances to the constitutional warrant requirement.15
Part II will discuss the history of the warrant requirement and its
application to the states.16 Part III will present the facts and relevant
procedural history17 of Middletown v. Flinchum.18 The Note will
conclude by analyzing the court’s reasoning and exploring the possible
consequences of its holding.19
II. BACKGROUND
A. The History of the Warrant Requirement
When interpreting20 Fourth Amendment protections21 courts have
14. Middletown v. Flinchum, 765 N.E.2d 330, 332 (Ohio 2002). When officers are in hot
pursuit of a suspect who flees into a residence, officers may enter that residence regardless of the
underlying offense. Id.
15. See Wayne A. Logan, The Ex Post Facto Clause and the Jurisprudence of Punishment, 35
AM. CRIM. L. REV. 1261, 1292 (1998) (arguing the court’s purpose is to act as a constitutional
buffer, giving effect to the fundamental right of the governed in the face of the at times arbitrary
powers of the legislature); Eulis Simien, Jr., The Interrelationship of the Scope of the Fourth
Amendment and Standing to Object to Unreasonable Searches, 41 ARK. L. REV. 487, 524 (1988)
(stating “the Constitution, which may not be changed in the ordinary process, was intended to be a
buffer against the injustices caused by the swayable passions of the majority”).
16. See infra notes 20-84 and accompanying text.
17. See infra notes 85-128 and accompanying text.
18. Flinchum, 765 N.E.2d at 331.
19. See infra notes 129-237 and accompanying text.
20. See Josephine R. Potuto, A Practitioner’s Primer to the Fourth Amendment, 70 NEB. L.
REV. 412 (1991) (summarizing Fourth Amendment law); Scott Lewis, An Historical Review of the
Fourth Amendment, 60 AUG WIS. B. BULL. 15 (1987) (discussing history and relevant case law of
Fourth Amendment); Thomas Y. Davies, The Fictional Character of Law-and Order Originalism:
A Case Study of the Distortions and Evasions of Framing-Era Arrest Doctrine in Atwater v. Lago
Vista, 37 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 239 (2002) (providing a historical approach counter to that taken
by the Supreme Court in Atwater v. Lago Vista).
21. U.S. CONST. amend. IV. The amendment states:
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against
unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated, and no Warrants shall issue,
but upon probable cause, supported by Oath or affirmation, and particularly describing
the place to be searched, and the persons or things to be seized.
Id. For a basic analysis of Search and Seizure law see Understanding Search and Seizure Law,
available at http://www.nolo.com/lawcenter/ency/article.cfm/objectID/DED24689-ADA8-4785887A0B4A19A694DE (last visited September 23, 2002) (providing a general summary of all Fourth
Amendment law). See also Stacy E. Roberts, Note, Bond and Beyond: A Shift in the Understanding
of What Constitutes a Fourth Amendment Search, 22 U. TOL. L. REV. 457 (2002) (discussing how
the Supreme Court has approached the concept of what is a search). Christopher Slobogin, The
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often relied on the state of common law during the framing of the
Constitution.22 In the early 1700s colonists were subjected to countless
searches based on little or even no suspicion.23 Some believe these
unreasonable searches were a contributing factor in the American
Revolution.24 Thus, it seems the framers were attempting to prevent
unreasonable intrusions25 by requiring probable cause,26 particularity,
and an oath prior to the issuance of a warrant.27
World Without a Fourth Amendment, 39 UCLA L. REV. 1 (1991) (presenting the question of how to
regulate searches and seizures if the Fourth Amendment did not exist).
22. Steagald v. United States, 451 U.S. 204, 217-20 n.1 (1981) (discussing the power of
constables at common law, but concluding “[t]he common law rules governing searches and arrests
evolved in a society far simpler than ours is today . . . it would . . . be naive to assume that those
actions a constable could take in an English or American village three centuries ago should
necessarily govern what we, as a society, now regard as proper”); Wilson v. Arkansas, 514 U.S.
927, 931 (1995) (recognizing that “[i]n evaluating the . . . [Fourth Amendment], we have looked to
the traditional protections against unreasonable searches and seizures afforded by the common law
at the time of the framing”). Contra Payton v. New York, 445 U.S. 573, 591 n.33 (1980)
(discussing Fourth Amendment’s prohibition against unreasonable searches and seizures should be
interpreted by today’s norms).
23. See generally Thomas K. Clancy, The Role of Individualized Suspicion in Assessing the
Reasonableness of Searches and Seizures, 25 U. MEM. L. REV. 483 (1995) (discussing the historical
abuses framers sought to prevent with the Fourth Amendment); Thomas Y. Davies, Recovering the
Original Fourth Amendment, 98 MICH. L. REV. 547 (1999) (arguing framers did not intend for a
constitutional standard to regulate warrantless officers because they never perceived the warrantless
officer as having the power to pose a significant threat to the security of person or house); Tracey
Maclin, Another Grave Threat to Liberty, 24 N.L.J. 12 (2001) (stating “[i]n 1706, for example,
colonial officials used such warrants to search every home in New Hampshire”).
24. Todd Witten, Note, Wilson v. Arkansas: Thirty Years After Ker the Supreme Court
Addresses the Knock and Announce Issue, 29 AKRON L. REV. 447,447 (1996) (stating some
scholars have argued the revolution was related to England’s lack of respect for the Colonists
personal privacy) (citing WAYNE LAFAVE, Search and Seizure: A Treatise on the Fourth
Amendment § 1.1(a) (2d ed. 1987) (providing a summary of Fourth Amendment law)).
25. See, e.g., Payton, 445 U.S. at 583-84. The first draft of the Fourth Amendment included a
clause limiting the issuance of warrants, however the final copy included a second clause. Id. The
first protected the citizens from unreasonable searches and seizures and the second clause required
warrants to be particular and supported by probable cause. Id. Thus, the framers wanted
protections from unreasonable searches and seizures, and wanted to prevent government abuse in
the form of general warrants. Id. Barbara C. Salken, The General Warrant of the Twentieth
Century? A Fourth Amendment Solution to Unchecked Discretion to Arrest for Traffic Offenses, 62
TEMP. L. REV. 221 (1989) (arguing intent of framers was to protect against the unlimited and
arbitrary exercise of power by the government), reprinted in 16 PACE L. REV. 97 (1996); cf. Surell
Brady, Arrests Without Prosecution and the Fourth Amendment, 59 MD. L. REV. 1, 10-13 (2000)
(discussing the drafting history of the Fourth Amendment).
26. Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213, 232 (1983) (stating “probable cause is a fluid concept
turning on the assessment of probabilities in particular factual contexts not readily, or even usefully,
reduced to a neat set of legal rules”). Thus, it seems that each factual situation must be analyzed by
whether the officer or magistrate was objectively reasonable in believing probable cause existed.
See Id.
27. U.S. CONST. amend. IV. See also Clancy, supra note 23, at 489-90 (discussing the
reasons for the creation of the Fourth Amendment).
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The home has been afforded greater protection under the Fourth
Amendment because it is the setting for the most intimate activities.28
The significance of personal privacy in the home was recognized in
early Seventeenth Century England.29 An English court forced the
King’s men to announce their purpose and presence prior to entry.30
This historical framework implies that the creation of the Fourth
Amendment was an attempt to safeguard our right to privacy in the
home.31
B. Balancing Test
One must concede that when the threat to society outweighs32 the
right to privacy, the warrant requirement may cause more harm than
good.33 For instance, society has a strong interest in fighting the war on
drugs and, without certain exceptions to the warrant rule, police are

28. Oliver v. United States, 466 U.S. 170, 178-79 (1984) (stating sanctity of home has been
embedded in our traditions since the origins of the Republic because it is the setting for the most
intimate activities). Alan W. Blackman, Comment, Warrantless Home Searches: The Road to
Calabretta, 22 J. JUV. L. 64 (2002) (summarizing Fourth Amendment law on intrusions in the
home).
29. Jennifer M. Goddard, Note, The Destruction of Evidence Exception to the Knock and
Announce Rule: A Call for Protection of Fourth Amendment Rights, 75 B.U. L. REV. 449, 453-61
(1995) (providing a historical analysis of the knock and announce rule).
30. See Semayne’s Case, 77 Eng. Rep. 194, 195 (K.B. 1603). In discussing the sheriff’s
authority to execute a civil writ of attachment the court stated that “[i]n all cases where the King is
party, the sheriff may break the house, either to arrest or do other execution of the King’s process, if
he cannot otherwise enter. But he ought first to signify the cause of his coming, and make request
to open the doors.” Id. See also Goddard, supra note 29, at 453. One author noted:
[T]he rule of announcement was so firmly entrenched in England by the latter part of the
eighteenth century, that the proposal by a noted jurist of no-knock powers for the police
was seen as a radical innovation . . . . In the years immediately before 1791, then, search
without announcement was not countenanced, despite repeated attempts to broaden
search powers to include it.
Note, Announcement in Police Entries, 80 YALE L.J. 139, 144 (1970). See also Tracey Maclin, Let
Sleeping Dogs Lie: Why the Supreme Court Should Leave Fourth Amendment History Unabridged,
82 B.U. L. REV. 895, 912 n.68 (2002) (providing a history of the Fourth Amendment).
31. Welsh v. Wisconsin, 466 U.S. 740, 748 (1984). The court has stated that “[a] principal
protection against unnecessary intrusions into private dwellings is the warrant requirement imposed
by the Fourth Amendment on agents of the government who seek to enter the home for purposes of
search or arrest.” Id.
32. See Kevin Lantz, Search and Seizure: “The Princess and the ‘Rock,’” Minnesota
Declines to Extend “Plain View” to “Plain Feel,” State v. Dickerson, 18 U. DAYTON L. REV. 539
(1993) (discussing Supreme Court’s use of the balancing test in Fourth Amendment cases).
33. See Amitai Etzioni, The Right to Privacy vs. the Common Good, USA TODAY MAG.,
September 2000, available at http://www.findarticles.com/cf_dls/m1272/2664_129/65230204/
p1/article.jhtml (8/29/2002) (providing an analysis of the balancing test imposed on the Fourth
Amendment).
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subdued by their inability to secure evidence needed for a conviction.34
Thus, our interest in public safety seemingly outweighs limited
infractions on the individual right to privacy.35 Recognizing the framers
could not have contemplated such issues, the Court has implemented a
balancing test between society’s interest, exercised through the
government, and the affected individual’s interest in privacy.36 When
attempting to decipher the governmental interest, the Court focuses on
the underlying crime because the applicable punishment impliedly
shows society’s value on preventing the crime in question.37
C. The Warrant Requirement
The Fourth Amendment protects citizens from unreasonable
government searches and seizures.38 In Katz v. United States,39 the
34. Donald B. Allegro, Note, Police Tactics, Drug Trafficking, and Gang Violence: Why the
No-Knock Warrant is an Idea Whose Time has Come, 64 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 552, 553 (1989)
(arguing “[in] light of the recent upsurge in narcotics and gang associated violence in many
communities, it is appreciably more difficult for police serving narcotics search warrants to
simultaneously seize admissible evidence and to ensure reasonable safety for themselves and
others”).
35. See Douglas Holden Wigdor, What’s in a Word? A Comparative Analysis of Article I, §12
of the New York State Constitution and the Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution as
Interpreted by the New York Court of Appeals and the United States Supreme Court, 14 TOURO L.
REV. 757 (1998) (discussing how conservative approaches to the Fourth Amendment prevent
numerous felony convictions); George F. Will, Not Too Strict To Apply Justice, WASH. POST June
17, 2001, at B7 (discussing use of thermo imaging devices as impermissible searches).
36. Wyoming v. Houghton, 526 U.S. 295, 299-300 (1999). The Court created a balancing test
to help deal with the rising crime problem. Id. This test recognizes the interest the government has
in fighting crime, and attempts to preserve citizens’ privacy rights as provided by common law. Id.
The Court noted:
In determining whether a particular governmental action violates this provision, we
inquire first whether the action was regarded as an unlawful search or seizure under the
common law when the Amendment was framed. Where that inquiry yields no answer,
we must evaluate the search or seizure under traditional standards of reasonableness by
assessing, on the one hand, the degree to which it intrudes upon an individual’s privacy
and, on the other, the degree to which it is needed for the promotion of legitimate
governmental interests.
Id. (citations omitted). Russell W. Galloway, Jr., Basic Fourth Amendment Analysis, 32 SANTA
CLARA L. REV. 737 (1992) (providing a step by step analysis for assessing Fourth Amendment
Cases).
37. See Welsh v. Wisconsin, 466 U.S. 740, 753 (1984) (holding the nature of the underlying
offense should be considered when determining whether exigent circumstances exist); cf. Payton v.
New York, 445 U.S. 573, 602 (1980) (limiting holding to felonies). See also Jonathan T. Skrmetti,
The Keys to the Castle: A New Standard for Warrantless Home Searches in United States v.
Knights, 25 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 1201 (2001) (discussing the balancing test put forth by the
Supreme Court).
38. U.S. CONST. amend. IV. “The right to be secure in their persons, houses papers, and
effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures . . . .” Id. Thomas K. Clancy, What Constitutes
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Supreme Court determined that, absent exigent circumstances,40 all
warrantless searches of the home are per se unreasonable.41 The Court
reasoned that the warrant requirement serves to minimize the danger of
needless intrusions.42 This rationale is based on the long held principle
that physical entry into the home is the chief evil against which the
Fourth Amendment is directed.43 The warrant provides restraint by
forcing a police officer to present his estimate of probable cause to a
judge or magistrate, and thus become bound by the precise limits
imposed by the court exercised through the warrant.44
an “Arrest” Within the Meaning of the Fourth Amendment?, 48 VILL. L. REV. 129 (2003)
(providing various definitions of the term arrest as used in Fourth Amendment search and seizure
cases). Evidence obtained in violation of one’s Fourth Amendment rights is excluded from trial.
Miles Clark, The Exclusionary Rule, 90 GEO. L.J. 1264 (2002) (providing an in depth review of the
exclusionary rule). Roberto Iraola, New Detection Technologies and the Fourth Amendment, 47
S.D. L. REV. 8 (2002) (discussing the application of the Fourth Amendment in today’s society).
39. 389 U.S. 347 (1967).
40. 28 OH. JUR. Criminal Law § 2147 (3d ed. 2001). Ohio has defined exigent circumstances
excusing warrantless home entry to include: hot pursuit, immediate threat to arresting officers or the
public, and immediate action needed to prevent destruction of evidence or escape. Id. See Dale
Joseph Gilsinger, Annotation, When is Warrantless Entry of House or Other Building Justified
Under “Hot Pursuit” Doctrine, A.L.R. (5th 2002), for a summary of other state approaches to the
hot pursuit doctrine. See also John F. Decker, Emergency Circumstances, Police Responses, and
Fourth Amendment Restrictions, 89 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 433 (1999) (focusing on the
application of the emergency doctrine as an exigent circumstance); James A. Adams, Search and
Seizure as Seen by Supreme Court Justices: Are they Serious or is this Just Judicial Humor?, 12 ST.
LOUIS U. PUB. L. REV. 413 (1993) (discussing drastic departure from the language used in the Katz
case).
41. Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 357 (1967). The Court stated:
‘Over and again this Court has emphasized that the mandate of the (Fourth) Amendment
requires adherence to judicial processes,’ United States v. Jeffers, 342 U.S. 48, and that
searches conducted outside the judicial process, without prior approval by judge or
magistrate, are per se unreasonable under the Fourth Amendment subject only to a few
specifically established and well-delineated exceptions.
Id.
42. Payton, 445 U.S. at 586 n.24. In discussing the purpose of the Fourth Amendment the
Court noted:
The point of the Fourth Amendment, which often is not grasped by zealous officers, is
not that it denies law enforcement the support of the usual inferences which reasonable
men draw from evidence. Its protection consists in requiring that those inferences be
drawn by a neutral and detached magistrate instead of being judged by the officer
engaged in the often competitive enterprise of ferreting out crime.
Id. (quoting Johnson v. United States, 333 U.S. 10, 13-14 (1948)).
43. United States v. U.S. Dist. Ct. E.D. Mich., 407 U.S. 297, 313 (1972), cited with approval
in Payton, 445 U.S. at 585-86.
44. Katz, 389 U.S. at 356. The Court found the agents’ search unreasonable because:
They were not required, before commencing the search, to present their estimate of
probable cause for detached scrutiny by a neutral magistrate. They were not compelled,
during the conduct of the search itself, to observe precise limits established in advance
by a specific court order. Nor were they directed, after the search had been completed,
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The necessity of the warrant was demonstrated in Payton v. New
York.45 In Payton, the Court struck down New York statutes authorizing
police to make warrantless home entries in the course of routine felony
arrests.46 Acknowledging the privacy interest a person has in his home,
the Court rejected the argument that an arrest in a public place was
indistinguishable from an arrest in the home.47
In addition to a warrant, the Supreme Court requires law
enforcement to knock and announce their presence prior to entering the
home in order to satisfy the reasonable search requirement.48 Later, the
Court held this requirement was a fundamental part of the Fourth
Amendment and is applicable to states through the Due Process
Clause.49 However, an exception has been recognized when police have
reasonable suspicion to believe that adhering to the rule in a particular
situation will be dangerous or will inhibit an effective investigation by

to notify the authorizing magistrate in detail of all that had been seized.
Id.
45. Payton, 445 U.S. at 587. The Court distinguished between seizure of objects in public
and plain view and those in the home. Id. See also Matthew A. Edwards, Posner’s Pragmatism
and Payton Home Arrests, 77 WASH. L. REV. 299 (2002) (discussing Posner’s pragmatic
application of social science to the Payton case). See Matthew Bell, Warrantless Home Arrests and
Police Liability Under Utah Law, 2002 B.Y.U. L. REV. 1131 (2002) (discussing potential liability
for officers who rely on a Utah statute which misleads officers into believing they have the authority
to make warrantless home arrests).
46. Payton, 445 U.S. at 577 n.6. The relevant portion of the New York law stated:
A peace officer may, without a warrant, arrest a person . . . When a felony has in fact
been committed, and he has reasonable cause for believing the person to be arrested to
have committed it . . . . [T]he officer may break open an outer or inner door or window
of a building, if, after notice of his office and purpose, he be refused admittance.
Id. (citations omitted).
47. Id. at 587. The Court reasoned that seizure in a public place is different because there is
no expectation of privacy, however, individuals do have such expectation in their homes. Id.
48. See Ker v. California, 374 U.S. 23, 40-44 (1963) (holding when evidence indicates
occupants were in the process of committing a felony of possession of marijuana, arrest of
occupants without warrants was valid and evidence seized was admissible); Miller v. United States,
357 U.S. 301, 313-14 (1958) (holding evidence seized by officers was inadmissible when, prior to
stating purpose and authority, they forced their way into defendant’s home by breaking the chain
lock); Charles Patrick Garcia, Note, The Knock and Announce Rule: A New Approach to the
Destruction of Evidence Exception, 93 COLUM. L. REV. 685, 687 (1993) (providing a common law
history of the knock and announce requirement and a history of relevant Supreme Court analysis).
49. Wilson v. Arkansas, 514 U.S. 927, 930 (1995). This decision was based primarily on the
longstanding history of the knock and announce rule in common law and its use in England. Id. at
931-37. While establishing this principle was apart of the Fourth Amendment’s reasonable
requirement, the Court noted that law enforcement interests may play a part in establishing the
reasonableness of an unannounced entry. Id. at 935-37. Thus, strict adherence to the knock and
announce rule is subject to the needs of society and law enforcement. Id. This interpretative
process was left to the lower courts. Id. at 936. For a further analysis of this case see Barnoski,
supra note 9.
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stimulating the destruction of evidence.50
D. Application of the Warrant Requirement to States
The Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution51 has
been extended to the states through the Due Process Clause52 of the
Fourteenth Amendment.53 The Due Process Clause affords all citizens
those fundamental rights that are basic to a free society.54 Malloy v.
Hogan55 determined that fundamental rights are to be considered under
the standards of federal law and not superseded by a less stringent state
standard.56 Thus, states are free to provide additional protection to the
50. Richards v. Wisconsin, 520 U.S. 385 (1997). In reviewing the Wisconsin Supreme
Court’s blanket exception to the knock and announce rule in drug cases the Court stated:
Thus, the fact that felony drug investigations may frequently present circumstances
warranting a no-knock entry cannot remove from the neutral scrutiny of a reviewing
court the reasonableness of the police decision not to knock and announce in a particular
case. Instead, in each case, it is the duty of a court confronted with the question to
determine whether the facts and circumstances of the particular entry justified dispensing
with the knock-and-announce requirement.
Id. at 394. The decision rested on the basis that the exception could easily be extended and was not
necessary in all cases. Id.
51. U.S. CONST. amend. IV.
52. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1.
All persons born or naturalized in the United States, and subject to the jurisdiction
thereof, are citizens of the United States and of the State wherein they reside. No State
shall make or enforce any law which shall abridge the privileges or immunities of
citizens of the United States; nor shall any State deprive any person of life, liberty, or
property, without due process of law . . . .
Id.
53. Wolf v. Colorado, 338 U.S. 25, 27-29 (1949). The Court attempted to explain the concept
of Due Process:
Due process of law thus conveys neither formal nor fixed nor narrow requirements. It is
the compendious expression for all those rights, which the courts must enforce because
they are basic to our free society . . . . It is of the very nature of a free society to advance
in its standards of what is deemed reasonable and right. Representing as it does a living
principle, due process is not confined within a permanent catalogue of what may at a
given time be deemed the limits of the essentials of fundamental rights.
Id. at 27.
54. Id. (holding the security of one’s privacy against arbitrary invasion by the police is basic
to a free society, and is therefore enforceable against the states through Due Process).
55. Malloy v. Hogan, 378 U.S. 1 (1964).
56. Id. at 10-11.
[T]he prohibition of unreasonable searches and seizures of the Fourth Amendment, and
the right to counsel guaranteed by the Sixth Amendment, are all to be enforced against
the States under the Fourteenth Amendment according to the same standards that protect
those personal rights against federal encroachment. In the coerced confession cases,
involving the policies of the privilege itself, there has been no suggestion that a
confession might be considered coerced if used in a federal but not a state tribunal. The
Court thus has rejected the notion that the Fourteenth Amendment applies to the States
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fundamental rights recognized in amendments to the U.S. Constitution,57
but this level of protection can never fall below federal interpretations.58
E. Exigent Circumstances
In Kirk v. Louisiana59 the Supreme Court made it clear that
warrantless home intrusions are justified when a police officer has
probable cause60 and exigent circumstances are present. Exigent
circumstances refer to those situations which require immediate
intervention, thus excusing the government from following procedural
requirements.61 The Court has long held that the hot pursuit doctrine
satisfies the exigent circumstance exception.62
Hot pursuit has been defined as an immediate pursuit from the
location of a crime63 involving some element of chase.64 The length of
the pursuit does not effect the determination of hot pursuit.65
only a ‘watered-down, subjective version of the individual guarantees of the Bill of
Rights.’
Id. (citation omitted).
57. See generally Justice Charles W. Johnson, Survey of Washington Search and Seizure Law:
1998 Update, 22 SEATTLE U. L. REV. 337 (1998) (surveying current case law in Washington
dealing with search and seizure); Lantz, supra note 32; Note, Search and Seizure, 14 TOURO L.
REV. 1167 (1998) (discussing how New York courts interpret constitutional language when the
federal and state statutes are similar); Robert M. Pitler, Independent State Search and Seizure
Constitutionalism: the New York State Court of Appeals’ Quest for Principled Decision Making, 62
BROOK. L. REV. 1 (1996) (discussing the difference between state and federal constitutional
approaches to search and seizure); Wigdor, supra note 34.
58. Malloy, 378 U.S. at 10-11. For a general discussion concerning various applications of
Due Process, see YALE KAMISAR ET AL., MODERN CRIMINAL PROCEDURE 32-33 (10th ed. 2002).
59. Kirk v. Louisiana, 536 U.S. 635, 638 (2002) (overturning a Louisiana Court of Appeals
decision that justified warrantless entry without establishing exigent circumstances).
60. Beck v. Ohio, 379 U.S. 89, 91 (1964). The Supreme Court has determined that probable
cause to arrest depends “upon whether, at the moment the arrest was made . . . the facts and
circumstances within [the arresting officers’] knowledge and of which they had reasonably
trustworthy information were sufficient to warrant a prudent man in believing that the [suspect] had
committed or was committing an offense.” Id. See also State v. Flinchum, No. CA99-11-193, 2000
WL 1843199, at *4 (Ohio Ct. App. 12th Dist. Dec. 8, 2000) (unpublished).
61. See BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 98 (Pocket ed. 1996), defining exigent circumstances as
“[a] situation that demands unusual or immediate action and that may allow people to circumvent
usual procedures, as when a neighbor breaks through a window of a burning house to save someone
inside.” Id.
62. See Steagald v. United States, 451 U.S. 204, 218 (1981). The Court overruled the Fifth
Circuit’s finding that an arrest warrant was enough to enter and search a third party’s house, absent
any showing of exigent circumstances. Id. at 222-23.
63. Welsh v. Wisconsin, 466 U.S. 740, 753 (1984).
64. See Johnson v. United States, 333 U.S. 10, 16 n.7 (1948) (“However, we find no element
of hot pursuit in the arrest of one who was not in flight . . . .”), cited with approval in United States
v. Santana, 427 U.S. 38, 43 n.3 (1976).
65. 5 AM. JUR. 2D Arrest § 123 (2000).
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F. Supreme Court Applications of Exigent Circumstances
1. United States v. Santana
The Supreme Court confronted the issue of warrantless home entry
and hot pursuit in United States v. Santana.66 After a drug sting, police
learned that Santana had possession of one hundred ten dollars in
marked bills.67 Santana fled into her home after seeing police pull up to
her house.68 Officers quickly apprehended Santana causing her to drop
two bundles of cocaine.69 The Court determined the hot pursuit doctrine
applied,70 and thus the failure to obtain a warrant did not prevent the
66. 427 U.S. 38, 39-44 (1976). See Jack E. Call, The Constitutionality of Warrantless
Doorway Arrests, 19 MISS. C. L. REV. 333, 333-34 (1999) (discussing the Supreme Court cases
dealing with the entry way and Fourth Amendment analysis).
67. Santana, 427 U.S. at 39. On August 16, 1974, Michael Gilletti, an undercover officer
with the Philadelphia Narcotics Squad arranged a heroin “buy” with Patricia McCafferty. Id.
McCafferty told the undercover officer it would cost $115 and that they would obtain the heroin
from Momma Santana. Id. “Gilletti notified his superiors of the impending transaction, recorded
the serial numbers of $110 (Sic) in marked bills, and went to meet McCafferty at a prearranged
location.” Id. McCafferty got into the undercover officer’s car and directed him to a home known
as the Santanas’ residence. Id. at 39-40. McCafferty went in and returned with the heroin, the
officer then showed his badge and asked who had the money. Id. at 40. McCafferty stated that
Momma Santana had the money. Id.
68. Santana, 427 U.S. at 40. They saw Santana standing in the doorway of her home with a
brown paper bag in her hand. Id. “They pulled up to within 15 feet of Santana and got out of their
van, shouting ‘police,’ and displaying their identification. As the officers approached, Santana
retreated into the vestibule of her house.” Id. For a discussion of how the Fourth Amendment has
been applied to the home, see Garnet M. Goins, Comment, Constitutional Law-Broadening the
Scope of Qualified Immunity to Public Officials from §1983 Liability for Conducting Warrantless
Entry into Individual’s Home, Joyce v. Town of Tewksbury, 32 SUFFOLK U. L. REV. 803, 812
(1999) (arguing the threshold of the home is the proper place to draw the line between a public
place and a private home).
69. Santana, 427 U.S. at 40.
70. Id. at 42. The Court noted that while the porch is private, cases analyzing the Fourth
Amendment focus on one’s expectation of privacy. Id.
While it may be true that under the common law of property the threshold of one’s
dwelling is “private,” as is the yard surrounding the house, it is nonetheless clear that
under the cases interpreting the Fourth Amendment Santana was in a “public” place. She
was not in an area where she had any expectation of privacy. “What a person knowingly
exposes to the public, even in his own house or office, is not a subject of Fourth
Amendment protection.” Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 351, 88 S. Ct. 507, 511, 19
L.Ed.2d 576 (1967). She was not merely visible to the public but was as exposed to
public view, speech, hearing, and touch as if she had been standing completely outside
her house. Hester v. United States, 265 U.S. 57, 59, 44 S.Ct. 445, 446, 68 L.Ed. 898
(1924). Thus, when the police, who concededly had probable cause to do so, sought to
arrest her, they merely intended to perform a function which we have approved in
Watson. The only remaining question is whether her act of retreating into her house
could thwart an otherwise proper arrest. We hold that it could not.
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admission of evidence found on Santana.71 The Court noted that,
because of the possibility of destruction of evidence,72 the need to act
quickly in this case is even more apparent than in Warden v. Hayden.73
Justice White concurred in the holding, but felt the absence of force
justified the entry of the home and not hot pursuit.74 Justice Stevens and
Justice Stewart separately concurred in the holding, and focused
primarily on the risk of evidence destruction.75 Justices Marshall and
Brennan dissented on the basis that the hot pursuit was created by the
officers and thus should not validate the entry.76
2. Welsh v. Wisconsin
In Welsh, the defendant left his car on the side of a road after
swerving out of control.77 After consulting a witness who informed
Id. at 42. See Katz, 389 U.S. at 351 (stating that “[w]hat a person knowingly exposes to the public,
even in his own house or office, is not a subject of Fourth Amendment protection”).
71. Santana, 427 U.S. at 43. “The fact that the pursuit here ended almost as soon as it began
did not render it any the less a “hot pursuit” sufficient to justify the warrantless entry . . . [o]nce
Santana saw the police, there was likewise a realistic expectation that any delay would result in
destruction of evidence.” Id. See Richard J. Schaen, Note, Pretextual Arrests: The Ninth Circuit
Invades the Home in United States v. Hudson, 66 U. CIN. L. REV. 1045 (1998). The author noted
that in this case officers did not have enough evidence to obtain a search warrant for the suspect, so
they obtained an arrest warrant which resulted form an undercover cop selling a small amount of
methamphetamine to the suspect. Id. at 1045. The officers knocked and announced with the
warrant but did not wait for an answer, rather they quickly entered and found the evidence they
were looking for. Id. at 1046. The author viewed this as a pretextual arrest, which true purpose was
to serve as a search warrant. Id. at 1047.
72. Santana, 427 U.S. at 42-43.
73. Warden v. Hayden, 387 U.S. 294, 298-300 (1967) (holding that where police are notified
that an armed robber wearing light cap and dark jacket has entered house and clothing matching
description is found in washing machine in house by officer without warrant before he knows a
weapon has been found in another part of the house, even though clothing was “mere evidence” and
had “evidential value only,” it is subject to seizure and admissible in the prosecution of the robber).
74. Id. at 43 (White, J., concurring). “It is not disputed here that the officers had probable
cause to arrest Santana and to believe that she was in the house. In these circumstances, a warrant
was not required to enter the house to make the arrest, at least where entry by force was not
required.” Id. (emphasis added).
75. Id. at 44-45. (Stevens, J., Stewart, J., concurring). After placing McCafferty under arrest
the police had enough information to obtain a warrant for Santana. Id. at 44. Therefore “their
failure to obtain a warrant . . . was both (a) a justifiable police decision, and (b) even if not
justifiable, harmless. The decision was justified by the significant risk that the marked money
would no longer be in Santana’s possession if the police waited until a warrant could be obtained.”
Id.
76. Id. at 45-49 (Marshall, J., Brennan, J., dissenting). Justice Marshall conceded that exigent
circumstances were present due to the close proximity of the arrest to the Santana home. Id. at 4748. However, this factor was in police control as they could have driven to a more remote location.
Id. at 48.
77. Welsh v. Wisconsin, 466 U.S. 740, 742 (1984). A passerby noticed a car swerve out of
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officers that the driver appeared intoxicated, the police obtained
defendant’s address from the vehicle’s registration.78 Without a warrant,
the police gained entry and found the defendant lying naked on a bed.79
In determining the entry was improper, the Court recognized that the
nature of the underlying offense80 was an important factor in
determining whether exigent circumstances were present.81 The Court
rejected the imminent destruction of evidence argument and concluded
that even if exigent circumstances were present, the traffic offense under
Wisconsin law was a non-criminal civil forfeiture offense.82
The Court concluded that entry into the home to arrest a person for
a civil traffic offense was clearly prohibited by the Fourth Amendment
because the State’s classification of the crime indicates a low interest in
arrest.83 Furthermore, they noted that it would be difficult to conceive of
a warrantless home arrest that would be reasonable under the Fourth
Amendment when the underlying offense is relatively minor.84
control and eventually run off the road. Id. The witness pulled up behind the car to prevent it from
leaving. Id. An additional passerby showed up and was instructed to call the police; however, the
defendant left the scene before police arrived. Id.
78. Id. The officer checked the motor vehicle registration to determine the defendant’s
address. Id. The officer noted that the address was close to the scene and thus easily within
walking distance. Id.
79. Id. at 743. Police arrived at the defendant’s home around 9 p.m. and gained entry after
defendant’s stepdaughter answered the door. Id . The issue of whether there was consent to enter
was never determined by the trial court because they found exigent circumstances. Id. at 473 n.1.
The issue was remanded, but the Wisconsin Supreme Court found exigent circumstances and the
issue became moot. Id. Since no determination was made, the Supreme Court assumed no consent
had been given for purposes of their decision. Id.
80. See William A. Schroeder, Factoring the Seriousness of the Offense into Fourth
Amendment Equations- Warrantless Entries into Premises: The Legacy of Welsh v. Wisconsin, 38
U. KAN. L. REV. 439 (1990) (discussing application of the Welsh decision).
81. Welsh, 466 U.S. at 753. (holding that “an important factor to be considered when
determining whether any exigency exists is the gravity of the underlying offense for which the arrest
is being made”).
82. Id. at 754. In response to the state’s exigency exception the court replied:
Even assuming, however, that the underlying facts would support a finding of this
exigent circumstance, mere similarity to other cases involving the imminent destruction
of evidence is not sufficient. The State of Wisconsin has chosen to classify the first
offense for driving while intoxicated as a noncriminal, civil forfeiture offense . . . . Given
this expression of the State’s interest, a warrantless home arrest cannot be upheld simply
because evidence of the petitioner’s blood-alcohol level might have dissipated while the
police obtained a warrant.
Id.
83. See id. at 754. The Court reasoned that since the State of Wisconsin has classified D.U.I
as a civil non-criminal offense, the State’s interest in arresting the defendant is low. Id. Thus, the
fact that evidence may be destroyed during the time it took to get a warrant is not enough to obtain
an exigent circumstance. Id.
84. Id. at 753. The Court listed several cases reaching differing decisions and noted that they
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III. STATEMENT OF FACTS
A. Facts
On the morning of April 23, 1999, officers John Newlin and Wayne
Birch observed a maroon car driven by Thomas E. Flinchum stopped at
a traffic signal in Middletown, Ohio.85 As the light changed Flinchum
spun his tires,86 causing the car to “fishtail” as it made a right turn.87
Officer Burch attempted to follow Flinchum but was unable to locate
Flinchum’s vehicle.88
A few moments later the officers saw Flinchum in another
intersection and again attempted to pursue the vehicle.89 As the officers
closed in, Flinchum came to a near halt and turned his vehicle sharply
down an alley.90 The officers, unable to make the sharp turn, were
forced to drive around the block.91 Upon circling the block, the officers
saw Flinchum standing near his car.92 The officers stopped their cruiser
to speak with Flinchum.93 Upon seeing the officers, Flinchum ran
towards the rear of his house while the officers yelled “Stop” and
“Police.”94 Officer Birch jumped through bushes and ran toward the rear
of the house.95 During this pursuit officer Birch heard the slamming of a
screen door.96 Birch, after observing Flinchum through a window,
entered the rear of the residence without permission and placed
Flinchum under arrest.97
did not approve of any one situation. Id. at 752-53. Recent Case, Criminal Procedure-Fourth
Amendment-Search and Seizure-Tenth Circuit Applies Reasonable Suspicion Standard to Stops for
Minor Traffic Infractions- United States v. Callarman, 116 HARV. L. REV. 697 (2002) (arguing the
Tenth Circuit failed to consider the seriousness of the suspected offense).
85. State v. Flinchum, No. CA99-11-193, 2000 WL 1843199, at *1 (Ohio Ct. App. 12th Dist.
Dec. 18, 2000) (unpublished).
86. Id.
87. Id.
88. Id.
89. State v. Flinchum, 765 N.E.2d 330, 334 (Ohio 2002) (Pfeifer, J., dissenting). The dissent
noted that upon viewing Flinchum’s acts the officers never activated their overhead lights. Id.
90. Flinchum, 2000 WL 1843199, at *1.
91. Id.
92. Id.
93. Id.; Liz Sidoti, Police Chased Man into His Home, CINCINNATI ENQUIRER, Dec. 20, 2001,
available at http://www.enquirer.com/editions/2001/12/20/loc_police_chased_man.html (providing
interviews with the key players in the Flinchum case).
94. Flinchum, 2000 WL 1843199, at *1.
95. Id.
96. Id.
97. Id.; Justice Paul E. Pfeifer, Weekly Column, Hot Pursuit and Warrantless Entry (May 15,
2002), available
at http://www.sconet.state.oh.us/Communications_Office/Justice_Pfeifer/
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B. Procedural History
1. Trial Court
Flinchum was charged with reckless driving, driving under the
influence (DUI), and resisting arrest.98 His attorney filed a motion to
suppress the evidence based on the officers’ warrantless entry.99 The
trial court found there was no need for a warrant because the officers
were in hot pursuit of Flinchum at the time of the intrusion.100 Flinchum
was acquitted of resisting arrest, but was convicted for DUI and reckless
operation.101
2. The Ohio Twelfth District Court of Appeals
Flinchum appealed the trial court’s denial of the suppression
motion.102 The appellate court recognized the limitations imposed by the
Welsh Court,103 but felt the case turned on whether or not jail time could
be imposed for the offense104 rather than its classification as a felony or
misdemeanor.105 The court recognized that reckless operation does not

2002/jp051502.asp [hereinafter Weekly Column]. The officer observed Flinchum through a kitchen
window, standing about five feet from the door. Id.
98. Flinchum, 2000 WL 1843199, at *1.
99. Id.
100. Id.
101. Id. The court granted the acquittal for resisting arrest pursuant to defendant’s Criminal
Rule 29 motion. Id. However, defendant received ninety days in jail and a suspended license for
three years for the D.U.I and reckless driving charges. Id.
102. Id. at * 2. Another issue on appeal was whether the trial court erred in conducting a bench
trial absent a jury waiver. Id. at *5. The court relied on Ohio Criminal Rule 23(A) to find failure to
demand a jury in a petty offense case in effect waives ones right to a jury trial. Id. at *5-6.
103. See Welsh v. Wisconsin, 466 U.S. 740 (1984), construed in Flinchum, 2000 WL 1843199,
at *2-4. The Welsh Court hesitated in determining whether exigent circumstances are present when
the underlying offense for which there is probable cause to arrest is relatively minor. Id. at *2.
104. See State v. Dobbins, No. 94APC02-276, 1994 WL 521187, at *3 (Ohio App. 10th Dist.
Sept. 22, 1994), cited with approval in Flinchum, 2000 WL 1843199, at *3. The Flinchum
appellate court refused to define all of Ohio’s misdemeanors as “minor offenses” to which the
exigent circumstance exception would not apply, and further stated the determining factor is not
classification but rather whether the offense is one that is punishable by jail. Flinchum, 2000 WL
1843199, at *3.
105. Flinchum, 2000 WL 1843199, at *3. The court relied on State v. Rouse, 53 Ohio App. 3d
48, 51 (Ohio Ct. App. 10th Dist. 1988) and State v. Marlow, No. 17400, 1996 WL 84627, at *4
(Ohio Ct. App. 9th Dist. Feb. 28, 1996) (unpublished), to hold that Welsh did not determine that a
warrantless intrusion into a home was unjustified when the offense involved was a non-criminal
civil forfeiture offense, not punishable by imprisonment, and where the arrest was not commenced
in a public place. Flinchum, 2000 WL 1843199, at *3-4.
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satisfy their interpretation of the Welsh standard.106 However, the court
felt the officer had probable cause to believe Flinchum was
committing107 the crime of resisting arrest,108 a jailable offense.109 The
court believed hot pursuit was present because Flinchum failed to obey
the officers’ orders.110
Upon finding the officer was in hot pursuit111 of a person suspected
of a jailable offense, the court held that the police were permitted to
follow the individual into his home to complete the lawful arrest.112 The
appellate court subsequently petitioned the Ohio Supreme Court to
decide whether the Fourth Amendment allows a warrantless entry into a
home if police are in pursuit of a person they suspect has committed a
misdemeanor.113
3. The Supreme Court of Ohio
Recognizing the lack of uniformity among Ohio courts,114 the Ohio
106. Id. at *4. The court cited Middletown, Ohio Codified Ordinance § 434.02, which defines
reckless operation as a minor misdemeanor punishable by a fine not greater than $100, and to which
no jail time may be imposed. See MIDDLETOWN, OHIO, CODIFIED ORDINANCE § 408.01(d).
107. Flinchum, 2000 WL 1843199, at *4. The court felt Flichum’s actions of fleeing upon the
officers’ arrival and disobeying their commands to stop gave the officers probable cause to believe
Flinchum was resisting arrest. Id.
108. OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2921.33.1(B) (Anderson 2000) (stating that “[n]o person shall
operate a motor vehicle so as willfully to elude or flee a police officer after receiving a visible or
audible signal from a police officer to bring the person’s motor vehicle to a stop”).
109. OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2929.21(B)(1) (Anderson 2000). The crime of first-degree
misdemeanor is punishable for up to six months in jail. Id.
110. Flinchum, 2000 WL 1843199, at *4. The court agreed with the trial court findings that
the police were in hot pursuit. Id.
111. Id. The court relied on Santana to conclude hot pursuit had taken place. “Where police
have probable cause to arrest an individual in a public place and are in “hot pursuit” of that
individual in the public place, the individual cannot defeat an otherwise lawful arrest by retreating
into his home or some other private place.” Id. (quoting United States v. Santana, 427 U.S. 38, 4243 (1976)).
112. Flinchum, 2000 WL 1843199, at *4. The court stated: “Officer Birch had probable cause
to believe appellant had committed a jailable offense, and the officer was in hot pursuit of appellant.
Under such circumstances, police may be permitted to follow the individual into his home to
complete the lawful arrest begun in public.” Id.
113. See Weekly Column, supra note 97.
114. See the following cases which permit the exigent circumstance exception to apply to
misdemeanor cases: State v. Marlow, No. 17400, 1996 WL 84627, at *4 (Ohio Ct. App. 9th Dist.
Feb. 28, 1996) (interpreting Welsh as turning on imprisonment and not a felony); State v. Raszick,
No. 93TRC11110, 1994 WL 728339 (Ohio Ct. App. 5th Dist. Dec. 29, 1994), appeal denied in, 649
N.E.2d 278 (1995) (interpreting Santana as allowing entry when officers are in hot pursuit of a
suspect who committed a misdemeanor in a public area); State v. Rouse, 557 N.E.2d 1227, 1229-30
(Ohio Ct. App. 10th Dist. 1988) (officer’s entry into suspect’s home was proper, when suspect
smelled of alcohol, slurred speech, refused to present his license and fled into his home). But see the
following cases refusing to allow exigent circumstances to apply in misdemeanor cases: State v.
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Supreme Court granted a motion to certify a conflict and requested the
parties to brief the issue.115 The court recognized the need for a warrant
prior to entering the home,116 but felt Santana117 and other jurisdictional
treatment118 compelled them to extend the hot pursuit doctrine to
misdemeanors.119 The court feared that adoption of such a rule would
lead to the illusion that fleeing an officer is justified where the accused
has only committed a misdemeanor.120 As a result, the court held that
when an officer is in hot pursuit of a suspect who attempts to defeat the
arrest by fleeing into his home, officers have the power to enter the
home regardless of the underlying offense.121
Justice Pfeifer disagreed with the majority and felt Santana was

Davis, 726 N.E.2d 1092 (Ohio Ct. App. 6th Dist. 1999) (emphasizing the distinction between a
felony and minor offenses and holding warrantless entry into a home to prevent destruction of
evidence from an underage drinking party was invalid); State v. Scott, 733 N.E.2d 653, 656-57
(Ohio Ct. App. 6th Dist. 1999) (holding that when underage persons were allegedly consuming
alcohol, no violence was involved and no persons were armed, risk of escape was not present, and
since resulting charges against defendant of contributing to delinquency of minor did not require
proof that juveniles had certain alcohol content, the need to preserve evidence was not an exigent
circumstance); Cleveland v. Shields, 663 N.E.2d 726, 728 (Ohio Ct. App. 8th Dist. 1995) (holding
police officers’ continuous chase of suspected felon fell within hot pursuit exception, permitting
officers to make warrantless entry into home to make arrest); State v. Banks, No. C-980774, 1999
WL 632924, at *2 (Ohio Ct. App. 1st Dist. Aug. 20, 1999) (holding officers’ entry into a third
party’s apartment to search for a suspect was unlawful especially considering the States failure to
provide the underlying offense); State v. Trammel, No. 17196, 1999 WL 22884, at *8 (Ohio Ct.
App. 2d Dist. Jan. 22, 1999) (finding exigent circumstances were not present when officers entered
suspect’s business property to give him a citation for disorderly conduct).
115. State v. Flinchum, 743 N.E.2d 402 (Ohio 2001) (unpublished table decision).
116. State v. Flinchum, 765 N.E.2d 330, 332 (Ohio 2003). The case noted that “physical entry
of the home is the chief evil against which the wording of the Fourth Amendment is directed.” Id.
(quoting United States v. U.S. Dist. Ct. for the E.D. of Mich., 407 U.S. 297, 313 (1972)).
117. Id. “Although Santana deals with the issue of warrantless home arrests in the context of a
felony suspect, we see no reason to differentiate appellant’s offense and give him a free pass merely
because he was not charged with a more serious crime.” Id.
118. Id. The court relied on State v. Penas, 263 N.W.2d 835, syllabus (Neb. 1978) (holding
that when a citizen has knowingly placed himself in a public place, and valid police action is
commenced in that public place, the citizen cannot thwart police action by fleeing into a private
place), and State v. Paul, 548 N.W.2d 260, 268 (Minn. 1996) (holding a police officer in hot pursuit
of a person suspected of the serious offense of driving under the influence of alcohol may make a
warrantless entry into the suspect’s home in order to effectuate an arrest).
119. Flinchum, 765 N.E.2d at 332 (holding “when officers, having identified themselves, are in
hot pursuit of a suspect who flees to a house in order to avoid arrest, the police may enter without a
warrant, regardless of whether the offense for which the suspect is being arrested is a
misdemeanor”).
120. Id. The court rejected Flinchum’s argument that officers were prevented from entering
his home because probable cause and exigent circumstances were absent and because the underlying
offense was merely a misdemeanor. Id.
121. Id.
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distinguishable from the case subjudice.122 In Santana, the court was
faced with the possible destruction of evidence and commission of a
felony, neither of which was present in Flinchum’s case.123 Therefore,
Justice Pfeifer felt the Welsh opinion was controlling.124 Under Welsh,
the government has the difficult task of rebutting a presumption of
unreasonableness in the finding of exigent circumstances.125 Justice
Pfeifer noted that the officers did not turn on their flashing lights or
sirens, and Flinchum was already running towards his house prior to any
remarks by the police.126
Justice Pfeifer concluded by comparing the potential gains and
losses from the decision.127 He determined the only benefit of the
majority decision was that Ohio police may enter the homes of
misdemeanants, but in addition to giving up a right that has been
guarded for over two hundred years, he noted the court has placed
homeowners and police in dangerous situations.128

122. Weekly Column, supra note 97. In his dissent, Justice Pfeifer noted:
[T]he police in Santana were faced with “a realistic expectation that any delay would
result in destruction of evidence.” They were also dealing with a felony. The Supreme
Court was willing to limit Fourth Amendment protections in a case where a serious
crime was committed and where evidence of that crime was liable to be compromised.
[In Flinchum], we are asked to weaken the Fourth Amendment in exchange for an arrest
on a minor traffic offense where there was no threat of the destruction of evidence. We
are dealing in this case with a fundamental part of a fundamental right- the “physical
entry of the home is the chief evil against which the wording of the Fourth Amendment
is directed.”
Flinchum, 765 N.E.2d at 333 (Pfeifer, J., dissenting) (citations omitted).
123. Id.
124. Id. Justice Pfeifer concluded:
The Welsh court recognized exceptions for exigent circumstances, but emphasized that
“exceptions to the warrant requirement are ‘few in number and carefully
delineated’. . .and that police bear a heavy burden when attempting to demonstrate an
urgent need that might justify warrantless searches or arrests.” In Welsh the court was
quick to point out that the exception carved out by Santana concerns “hot pursuit of a
fleeing felon.”
Id. (citations omitted).
125. See Payton v. New York, 445 U.S. 573, 586 (1980), cited with approval in Welsh v.
Wisconsin, 466 U.S. 740, 750 (1984).
126. Flinchum, 765 N.E.2d at 334 (Pfeifer, J., dissenting). Justice Pfeifer concluded the chase
was more of a “luke warm amble” than a hot pursuit. Id.
127. Id.
128. Id.
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IV. ANALYSIS
A. The Rationale Behind Flinchum
1. The Severity of Punishment Identifies the Societal Interest
The Ohio Supreme Court relied heavily on the idea that there is no
reason to distinguish between crimes of varying severity.129 However,
the level of punishment associated with a crime reflects society’s interest
in preventing such crimes.130 Presumably, if society has a strong interest
in preventing a crime they will pressure the state legislature to increase
the penalty.131 When determining exceptions to the Fourth Amendment,
courts must balance the government interest, as represented by society,
against the private individual’s right to privacy.132 By finding no reason
to differentiate between the severity of crimes, the Ohio Supreme Court
has extinguished the balancing test, resulting in the right to privacy
being permanently outweighed in the realm of hot persuit.133
129. Flinchum, 765 N.E.2d at 332. “Although Santana deals with the issue of warrantless
home arrests in the context of a felony suspect, we see no reason to . . . give [appellant] a free pass
merely because he was not charged with a more severe crime.” Id. Dawn Marie Johnson, The
AEDPA and the IIRIA: Treating Misdemeanors as Felonies for Immigration Purposes, 27 J. LEGIS.
477, 478-79 (2001) (providing a history of the misdemeanor-felony distinction). Gabriel M.
Helmer, Note, Strip Search and the Felony Detainee: A Case for Reasonable Suspicion, 81 B.U. L.
REV. 239 (2001) (explaining application of the felony-misdemeanor distinction to strip search law).
130. Flinchum, 765 N.E.2d at 333 (Pfeifer, J., dissenting). The Court in Santana was dealing
with a felony. Id. “The Supreme Court was willing to limit Fourth Amendment protections in a
case where a serious crime was committed and where evidence of that crime was liable to be
compromised. Here, we are asked to weaken the Fourth Amendment in exchange for an arrest on a
minor traffic offense where there was not threat of the destruction of evidence.” Id. See also
William A. Schroeder, Warrantless Misdemeanor Arrests and The Fourth Amendment, 58 MO. L.
REV. 771, 802-04, 812 (1993) (discussing the distinction between felonies and misdemeanors).
131. See Carolyn B. Ramsey, The Discretionary Power of “Public” Prosecutors in Historical
Perspective, 39 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 1309, 1369 (2002) (“Elizabeth Rapaport argues that domestic
homicides result in more lenient treatment for defendants than predatory crimes because modern
American society assigns less moral outrage to wife-killing.”); Michael Vitiello, Punishment and
Democracy: A Hard Look at Three Strikes’ Overblown Promises, 90 CAL. L. REV. 257, 288 (2002)
(describing the three strikes laws as too harsh in comparison to the actual crime done to society);
JOSHUA DRESSLER, UNDERSTANDING CRIMINAL LAW § 31.06B(3), at 481 (2d ed. 1995) (stating
felony murder rule “reflects society’s judgment that the commission of a felony resulting in death is
more serious-and, therefore, deserves greater punishment than the commission of a felony not
resulting in death”); Richard Brooks Holcomb, Note, Predicate Offenses for First Degree Felony
Murder in Virginia, 57 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 561, 568 n.39 (2000) (discussing Virginia’s felony
murder rule).
132. Wyoming v. Houghton, 526 U.S. 295, 299-300 (1999) (comparing the government’s
interest in law enforcement against the individual’s right to privacy).
133. Flinchum, 765 N.E.2d at 332. The court relied solely on the fact that Flinchum ran from
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The U.S. Supreme Court in Welsh recognized there is a distinction
to be found in the severity of crimes, and accordingly held that a court
should be hesitant in finding exigent circumstances when the underlying
crime is relatively minor.134 The Court stated that even if the
circumstances had lent themselves to finding the necessity of immediate
state action, Wisconsin chose to classify a DUI as a civil non-criminal
offense for which no imprisonment is possible.135 Thus, if Wisconsin
had provided a greater penalty for DUI, the chance of finding an exigent
circumstance would have increased.136 The Court emphasized this idea
by stating that this classification is the best indicator of the State’s
interest in preventing this crime.137 By finding an exigency present
police and provided no other basis for their decision. Id. See also Melissa Fernandez, The Fourth
Amendment: Administrability Defeats Reasonableness in the Application of Arrest Law, 54 FLA. L.
REV. 827 (2002) (discussing misdemeanor arrests); Schroeder, supra note 78 (discussing
application of the Welsh decision); Raymond Hayes, Balancing Victims’ Rights and Probative
Value with the Fourth Amendment Right to Security in the Exclusion of Unlawfully Seized Evidence,
N.Y.L. SCH. J. HUM. RTS. 271 (2002) (presenting a balancing test that includes the victim’s rights).
See also Kuras, supra note 6, at 1140 (providing balancing test that is measured by the degree of
intrusion versus states need to ensure public safety).
134. Welsh v. Wisconsin, 466 U.S. 740, 749-50 (1984). The Supreme Court stated that
“exceptions to the warrant requirements are ‘few in number and carefully delineated’ and that the
police bear a heavy burden when attempting to demonstrate an urgent need that might justify
warrantless searches or arrests.” Id. (citations omitted). The Court then cited Santana in which the
parenthetical stated “hot pursuit of a fleeing felon.” Id. at 750. Therefore, there may be an
argument over whether Santana is limited to hot pursuit of felons.
135. Id. (stating “[o]ur hesitation in finding exigent circumstances, especially when warrantless
arrests in the home are at issue, is particularly appropriate when the underlying offense for which
there is probable cause to arrests is relatively minor”). It is puzzling how a court can say hot
pursuit, an exigency, constitutes a per se exception to the warrant requirement. William W.
Greenhalgh & Mark J. Yost, In Defense of the “Per Se” Rule: Justice Stewart’s Struggle to
Preserve the Fourth Amendment’s Warrant Clause, 31 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 1013 (1994) (presenting
the arguments focusing on a literal interpretation of the Fourth Amendment). See supra notes 77-84
and accompanying text.
136. See Jonathan L. Hafetz, “A Man’s Home is His Castle?”: Reflections on the Home, the
Family, and Privacy During the Late Nineteenth and Early Twentieth Centuries, 8 WM. & MARY J.
WOMEN & L. 175 (2002) (explaining the development of search and seizure law in regard to the
home from 1870 through 1920). In United States v. Santana, the Court allowed entry because Mrs.
Santana was carrying drugs, and upon viewing police, was likely to destroy evidence of a potential
felony drug crime. Santana, 427 U.S. at 43 (stating “[o]nce Santana saw the police, there was
likewise a realistic expectation that any delay would result in destruction of evidence”). Such
examples seem rare when viewed in the arena of misdemeanors.
137. Welsh, 466 U.S. at 754 (commenting that Wisconsin had chosen to classify DUI as a noncriminal, civil forfeiture case and this classification was the best indicator of a State’s interest in
preventing a crime). The Supreme Court has stated that there must be a compelling necessity for
immediate action to prevent the potential harm that a delay in obtaining a warrant could present,
however such compelling necessities are unlikely in misdemeanor cases. Warden v. Hayden, 387
U.S. 294, 298-99 (1967). See also Robert S. Leming, Teaching About the Fourth Amendment’s
Protection Against Unreasonable Searches and Seizures, available at http://www.ed.gov/
databases/ERIC_Digests/ed363526.html (last updated May 1993) (providing an analysis of
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during all hot pursuits regardless of the offense, the Ohio Supreme Court
rejects the societal interest as well as some of the basic protections
provided by the U.S. Supreme Court.138
The Ohio Twelfth District Court of Appeals properly differentiated
Welsh on the basis of whether the underlying offense is a jailable or nonjailable offense.139 It should be noted that the U.S. Supreme Court
rejected the jailable/non-jailable distinction in the context of warrantless
misdemeanor arrests140 in Atwater v. City of Lago Vista.141 The Court
was concerned that the jailable distinction rests on factors not readily
apparent, such as whether the suspect has previously been convicted or

Supreme Court decisions concerning unreasonable searches and seizures). In Warden, the court
allowed police to enter a home after they had probable cause to believe that an armed robber had
entered a home, thus the potential for imminent harm was great. Warden, 387 U.S. at 298
(recognizing the right of police to make a warrantless entry when they have probable cause to
believe an armed robber had entered a house a few minutes before).
138. See Welsh, 466 U.S. at 753. The Court specifically held:
[A]n important factor to be considered when determining whether any exigency exists is
the gravity of the underlying offense for which the arrest is being made. Moreover,
although no exigency is created simply because there is probable cause to believe that a
serious crime has been committed, see Payton, application of the exigent- circumstances
exception in the context of a home entry should rarely be sanctioned when there is
probable cause to believe that only a minor offense, such as the kind at issue in this case,
has been committed.
Id.
139. State v. Flinchum, No. CA99-11-193, 2000 WL 1843199, at *3 (Ohio Ct. App. 12th Dist.
Dec. 18, 2000) (unpublished). The court determined that,
consistent with Welsh, the operative analysis for determining whether the underlying
offense is a “minor” one for purposes of an officer’s warrantless entry into a home is not
whether the offense is a felony or a misdemeanor; the determinative factor is whether the
offense is one that is punishable by jail or imprisonment.
Id. But see Dan T. Coenen, The Rehnquist Court, Structural Due Process, and Semisubstantive
Constitutional Review, 75 S. CAL. L. REV. 1281, 1337-38 (2002) (the author argues that the amount
of protection afforded will decrease rather than increase with the seriousness of the crime, but one
would assume that we need the greatest protection when the punishment is greatest).
140. Atwater v. City of Lago Vista, 532 U.S. 318, 348-49 (2001). The Court felt it would be
too difficult to apply such a distinction when the officer was attempting to make an arrest. Id. See
Patrick S. Yatchak, Note, Breaching the Peace: The Trivialization of the Fourth Amendment
Reasonableness Standard in the Wake of Atwater v. City of Lago Vista, 25 HAMLINE L. REV. 329
(2002) (providing various crimes for which an individual can be arrested and taken to jail, including
eating a ham sandwich on the subway in violation of a county ordinance in New York).
141. Atwater, 532 U.S. at 318. Texas law made it a misdemeanor violation for not wearing a
seat belt, which allowed warrantless arrest for anyone in violation. Id. at 323. An officer pulled
Atwater over for violating the law and “verbally berated her, handcuffed her, placed her in his squad
car, and drove her to the local police station, where she was made to remove her shoes, jewelry, and
eyeglasses, and empty her pockets.” Id. at 324. Her mug shot was taken and she was placed in a
cell for almost an hour. Id. She pleaded no contest to the seatbelt misdemeanors and paid a $50
fine. Id. The Court stated that “the physical incidents of arrest were merely gratuitous humiliations
imposed by a police officer who was (at best) exercising extremely poor judgment.” Id. at 346-47.
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the amount of marijuana in a bag.142 However, asking whether the
officer had a reasonable belief that the suspect had committed a jailable
offense would easily counter such arguments.143 Furthermore, Atwater
dealt with a warrantless arrest in a public place, which does not require
as much protection as warrantless home intrusions.144
2. Jurisdictional Support
The Ohio Supreme Court relied on two cases, Minnesota v. Paul
and Nebraska v. Penas, in upholding the warrantless entry.145 In
Minnesota v. Paul, a police officer was in an auto parts store when the
defendant put his arm around the officer and began to talk to him.146
The officer smelled alcohol on the defendant but never questioned him.
The officer then saw the defendant climb into a truck.147 Deciding to
follow him, the officer observed defendant roll through a stop sign and
fishtail into a turn.148 At this point the officer activated the overhead
lights and pursued defendant for several miles on the highway and
eventually to defendant’s residence.149 The officer knocked on the front
door and spoke with the defendant’s wife who insisted her husband was

142. Atwater, 532 U.S. at 348-49. The Court felt it was impractical for an officer to determine
if it was the suspect’s first arrest. Id. at 348. They also felt that it was impossible to determine if
the amount of marijuana in a bag was an ounce or less than an ounce. Id. at 348-49. Thus, the
standard would be too difficult to apply and require a case by case application. Id.
143. Interview with J. Dean Carro, Professor of Law at the University of Akron School of Law
in Akron, Ohio (February, 4, 2003) (discussing the potential application of the jailable standard in
relation to Atwater, 532 U.S. 318 (2001)). It seems a court could easily apply this standard to
determine if the amount of marijuana in a bag could reasonably be viewed as a jailable offense. Id.
I would also advocate that it is unreasonable for an officer to assume an individual had committed a
previous offense, absent actual knowledge. Id.
144. See Atwater, 532 U.S. at 323-27. Also, Atwater involved a vehicle to which the Court has
been unwilling to extend an amount of privacy equal to that of a home. California v. Carney, 471
U.S. 386, 391 (1985) (“[L]ess rigorous warrant requirements govern because the expectation of
privacy with respect to one’s automobile is significantly less than that relating to one’s home or
office.”); The Court has generally found that “law enforcement officials [are granted] greater
latitude in exercising their duties in public places.” Florida v. White, 526 U.S. 559, 565 (1999).
The Court also found that a suspect is not in custody for mere questioning on a public street because
a motorist is in view of the public thus decreasing any chance of police misconduct. Berkemer v.
McCarty, 468 U.S. 420, 438 (1984). Because we have a greater interest in privacy in the home, a
court should be more willing to accept this argument as it outweighs the associated uncertainty.
145. State v. Flinchum, 765 N.E.2d 330, 332 (Ohio 2002). “Similar conclusions have already
been reached in other jurisdictions,” in Nebraska and Minnesota. Id.
146. State v. Paul, 548 N.W.2d 260, 262 (Minn. 1996).
147. Id. The officer walked across the street to a gas station, after four or five minutes he saw
the defendant walk out of the auto parts store and climb into his pickup truck. Id.
148. Id.
149. Id. at 262-63.
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not home.150 However, the officer entered the home and eventually
found the defendant emerging from the basement.151
In Paul, the court distinguished Welsh primarily on the ground that
driving under the influence was a criminal offense rather than a civil
forfeiture offense; however, in Flinchum the Welsh holding was
completely ignored.152 Therefore, Paul does not support the proposition
that hot pursuit is justified regardless of the underlying offense.153
In Nebraska v. Penas an officer who witnessed a van veer into
oncoming traffic and make a U-turn decided to follow the vehicle.154
After reaching the defendant’s home the officer ordered the defendant to
stop; however, the defendant proceeded into the house.155 The officer
followed, but decided to radio for backup out of concern for his
safety.156 Another officer arrived and they entered the home to arrest the
defendant.157 The court relied upon Santana in upholding the arrest;
however, this case was decided six years before the Welsh opinion.158 In
150. Id. at 263. Upon reaching the house the defendant ran out of his truck towards the garage.
Id. The officer reached the door but it was locked. After asking for the door to be opened the
officer went around to the front of the house. Id. Defendant’s wife answered the front door and
stated the defendant was not home. Id. The officer asked the wife to look inside the house to make
sure he was not home. Id. Compare Paul, 548 N.W.2d at 263 (knocking on the door and asking,
“Sir, come on out, answer the door, come out and talk to me”) with State v. Flinchum, 765 N.E.2d
330, 331 (2002) (stating “[w]ithout appellant’s permission, Officer Birch entered the home and
arrested him”); State v. Stuber, No. 1-02-20, 2002 WL 31618993, at *1 (Ohio Ct. App. 3d Dist.
Nov. 21, 2002) (forcing open a locked door).
151. Paul, 548 N.W.2d at 263. The officer looked in the kitchen and garage but was unable to
find the defendant. Id. The officer began to question defendant’s wife when the defendant emerged
from the basement. Id.
152. Id. at 266. The court differentiated Welsh on three grounds: “(1) the officer was in hot
pursuit; (2) there was a need to preserve evidence of the defendant’s blood alcohol level; and (3) the
ordinance or statute under which the defendant was arrested provided for criminal penalties and not
merely noncriminal civil forfeitures.” Id. Flinchum, 765 N.E.2d at 330 (failing to cite the Welsh
opinion). It should be noted that the first two grounds appear completely illusory as the Welsh
Court stated that “a warrantless home arrest cannot be upheld simply because evidence of the
petitioner’s blood-alcohol level might have dissipated while the police obtained a warrant.” Welsh
v. Wisconsin, 466 U.S. 740, 754 (1984). The Court further stated that “[e]ven assuming, however,
that the underlying facts would support a finding of . . . [hot pursuit], mere similarity to other cases
involving the imminent destruction of evidence is not sufficient . . . [because] [t]he State of
Wisconsin has chosen to classify . . . [D.U.I.] . . . as a noncriminal, civil forfeiture offense for which
no imprisonment is possible.” Id.
153. Flinchum, 765 N.E.2d at 332. The court clearly evidenced they found no distinction
between felonies and misdemeanors by saying: “[W]e see no reason to differentiate appellant’s
offense and give him a free pass merely because he was not charged with a more serious crime.” Id.
154. State v. Penas, 263 N.W.2d 835, 836 (Neb. 1978).
155. Id.
156. Id.
157. Id.
158. Id at 837.
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fact, after deciding this case Nebraska courts have interpreted Welsh as
turning on whether the underlying crime is punishable by jail.159
Clearly, the cases cited by the Ohio Supreme Court do not support the
contention that the underlying offense is irrelevant in determining an
exigency.160
It seems the majority of jurisdictions have interpreted Welsh as
prohibiting warrantless home intrusions when the offense is a nonjailable.161 Relatively few courts have been willing to follow Flinchum
and hold that hot pursuit alone creates an exigency to enter the home
regardless of the underlying offense.162
B. Balancing Test: Governmental Interest
1. Bright Line Rules
The Supreme Court of Ohio has created a bright line rule that
allows officers to enter a home during the hot pursuit of any offense.163
159. State v. Beeken, 585 N.W.2d 865 (Neb. Ct. App. 1998); State v. Gerstner, No. A-91-1256,
1993 WL 44493, at *6 (Neb. Ct. App. Feb. 23, 1993) (finding that the Supreme Court of Nebraska
requires a serious offense to the finding of an exigency) (quoting State v. West, 388 N.W.2d 823,
830 (Neb. 1986)).
160. State v. Flinchum, 765 N.E.2d 330, 332 (Ohio 2002) (opining “we see no reason to
differentiate appellant’s offense and give him a free pass merely because he was not charged with a
more serious crime”).
161. Dyer v. State, 680 So.2d 612, 613 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1996) (distinguishing on whether
jail is possible); Goines v. James, 433 S.E.2d 572, 578 (W.Va. 1993) (focusing on whether the
underlying offense is punishable by jail); State v. Legg, 633 N.W.2d 763, 773 (Iowa 2001)
(distinguishing Welsh on the basis that Wisconsin had classified DUI as a civil non-forfeiture
offense for which no jail was possible); State v. Blake, 468 N.E.2d 548, 552 (Ind. Ct. App. 1984)
(adopting Justice White’s dissent in Welsh and focusing on the severity of the underlying offense);
Hamrick v. State, 401 S.E.2d 25, 26-27 (Ga. Ct. App. 1990) (finding that when officers pursued a
yellow motorcycle and then later found it leaning against a house, they could not enter the residence
even though they were in hot pursuit because there was no danger of destruction of evidence, and
the suspect had only committed a misdemeanor); State v. Mikkelson, 647 N.W.2d 421, 424-25
(Wisc. Ct. App. 2002) (finding no exigent circumstances present when officers were in hot pursuit
of a suspect for obstructing an officer which is a misdemeanor); Waugh v. State, 51 S.W.3d 714,
718 n.3 (Texas Ct. App. 2001) (distinguishing on basis of whether jail is possible).
162. People v. Lloyd, 265 Cal. Rptr. 422, 425 (Cal. Ct. App. 1989) (holding it does not matter
whether the underlying offense is a misdemeanor or a felony); State v. Ramirez, 814 P.2d 1131,
1134-35 (Utah Ct. App. 1991) (finding hot pursuit is enough to create an exigency and it does not
matter what is the underlying offense).
163. Flinchum, 765 N.E.2d at 332. By creating a bright line rule for hot pursuit, the court has
sanctioned entrance to the home for any crime, regardless of the nature of the offense, weakening
the already strained warrant requirement. Id. at 334 (Pfeifer, J., dissenting). Jennifer Ison Cooke,
Discretionary Warrantless Searches and Seizures and the Fourth Amendment: A Need for Clearer
Guidelines, 53 S.C. L. REV. 641 (2002) (discussing contradictions in Supreme Court cases dealing
with warrantless arrests). Rachael M. Dockery, Note, Atwater v. City of Lago Vista A Simple,
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The United States Supreme Court has shown a preference for bright line
rules in some situations, primarily because they clarify the duties of law
enforcement and allow easier application of decisions.164 However, the
Court has been hesitant in applying such rules when the costs exceed
these potential benefits.165
In Richards v. Wisconsin, the Court conceded that felony drug
investigations frequently involve violent circumstances and the risk of
evidence destruction.166 In rejecting a bright line rule allowing no-knock
entries in felony drug arrests, the Court focused on two factors.167 First,
this bright line rule is based on an overgeneralization, that is while some
drug investigations pose great danger, others vary considerably as to the
degree of harm associated.168 Second, the exceptions for one category
can easily be applied and expanded to other categories.169
As we consider the bright line rule given by the Ohio Supreme
Court we see that a great overgeneralization has occurred.170 The court
has decided that all fleeing misdemeanants are of such a danger that
Ohio police may forcefully enter homes.171 If the Supreme Court was
Bright-Line Holding Results in Future Fourth Amendment Confusion, 55 ARK. L. REV. 577 (2002)
(discussing the Atwater v. City of Lago Vista case and detailing the problems with the bright line
holding and how it compares to the balancing test).
164. California v. Acevedo, 500 U.S. 565, 576-79 (1991) (finding the old Chadwick-Sanders
rule too confusing for police to apply); New York v. Belton, 453 U.S. 454 (1981) (“A single,
familiar standard is essential to guide police officers, who have only limited time and expertise to
reflect on and balance the social and individual interests involved in the specific circumstances they
confront.”) (quoting Dunaway v. New York, 442 U.S. 200, 213-14 (1979)).
165. Richards v. Wisconsin, 520 U.S. 385, 393 (1997) (rejecting Wisconsin’s per se rule for no
knock entries during routine felony arrests because not all felony arrests will have the possibility of
destruction of evidence or impair the safety of officers).
166. Richards, 520 U.S. at 392 (recognizing that the knock-and-announce requirement could
give way “under circumstances presenting a threat of physical violence,” or “where police officers
have reason to believe that evidence would likely be destroyed if advance notice were given”)
(quoting Wilson v. Arkansas, 514 U.S. 927, 936 (1995)).
167. Richards, 520 U.S. at 392 (creating exceptions to the knock-and–announce rule based on
the culture surrounding a general category of criminal behavior presents at least two serious
concerns). See Lawrence Rosenthal, Policing and Equal Protection, 21 YALE L. & POL’Y REV. 53
(2003) (arguing that police should study crime patterns in order to learn what creates crime and
focus on the elimination of such problems).
168. Richards, 520 U.S. at 393 (“First, the exception contains considerable overgeneralization.
For example, while drug investigation frequently does pose special risks to officer safety and the
preservation of evidence, not every drug investigation will pose these risks to a substantial
degree.”).
169. Id. at 393-94 (stating that “[a] second difficulty with permitting a criminal-category
exception to the knock-and announce requirement is that the reasons for creating an exception in
one category can, relatively easily, be applied to others”).
170. State v. Flinchum, 765 N.E.2d 330, 334 (Ohio 2002) (Pfeifer, J., dissenting) (arguing the
only thing gained by this ruling is allowing the police to enter the households of tire spinners).
171. Id. at 332 (holding warrants are not required for fleeing suspect regardless of whether the

http://ideaexchange.uakron.edu/akronlawreview/vol37/iss3/3

26

Vaughn: Middletown v. Flinchum
VAUGHAN1.DOC

2004]

4/19/2004 10:25 AM

MIDDLETOWN V. FLINCHUM

535

unwilling to assume that all felony drug arrests are surrounded by
dangerous circumstances, then it seems implausible to assume, as
Flinchum does, that all fleeing misdemeanants require extreme
precautions.172 The second concern is that at some point the exceptions
to the warrant requirement will extinguish its existence.173 It is
important to note that the Court in Richards was unwilling to extend the
law to allow no-knock entries when police already have a warrant,174
where as the holding in Flinchum creates a bright line rule for officers
who do not have a warrant.175 As the dissent in Flinchum suggests, the
benefit received by such a bright line rule is minor when compared to
the possible consequences.176
2. Swifter Law Enforcement
It seems the major benefit of the ruling is that officers save valuable
time often spent attempting to obtain a warrant.177 However, this benefit
offense being committed was a misdemeanor).
172. See supra notes 166-167 and accompanying text.
173. Brady, supra note 25, at 21 (discussing the consequences of the warrant exceptions).
Consequences of laws such as the one created in Flinchum include: exceptions to the warrant rule
become the rule, increases in arrests due to less procedural grounds for a warrant, and broad police
authority coupled with operational stresses in the court system removes the buffer between the
government and individuals which undermines the intent of the framers. Id.; Bookspan, supra note
9 (arguing lack of coherent guidelines has rendered the Fourth Amendment useless); Charles W.
Chotvacs, The Fourth Amendment Warrant Requirement: Constitutional Protection or Legal
Fiction? Noted Exceptions Recognized by the Tenth Circuit, 79 DENV. U. L. REV. 331 (2002)
(addressing the large number of current exceptions to the warrant rule as decided in the U.S. Tenth
Circuit Court of Appeals); Garcia, supra note 48, at 687 (arguing against blanket or particularity
approaches and proposing a reasonable alternative approach that resolves contradictory public
policy goals of effective law enforcement and protection of individualized liberty).
174. Richards, 520 U.S. at 388. Police in Richards had already obtained a warrant, thus a
neutral detached magistrate had already made a decision. Id. However, this was still not enough
protection from unreasonable searches to allow this bright line rule. See Id. at 395-96.
175. Flinchum, 765 N.E.2d at 332.
176. Id. at 334 (Pfeifer, J., dissenting). Ohio police are now able to enter the homes of “tire
spinners.” Id.
177. Id. at 332 (holding “when officers, having identified themselves, are in hot pursuit of a
suspect who flees to a house in order to avoid arrest, the police may enter without a warrant,
regardless of whether the offense for which the suspect is being arrested is a misdemeanor”). See
Christine A. Haberle, Note, Search and Seizure—Stop and Frisk—Evidence Seized Incident to an
Arrest that is Based Upon a Police Officer’s Computer Record that Failed to Indicate that the
Arrest Warrant had been Quashed, due to an Error Committed by Court Personnel, is Within the
Scope of the Good Faith Exception to the Exclusionary Rule Arizona v. Evans, 26 SETON HALL L.
REV. 866 (1996) (arguing for liberal interpretations of Fourth Amendment exceptions. Specifically,
strict application of exclusionary rule is improper because it will set the guilty free and it provides
no impermissible burden on citizens rights). See Los Angeles Police Department Board of Inquiry
into the Rampart Area Corruption Incident, Public Report 67 (2000) [hereinafter Rampart Incident]
(finding L.A. anti-gang officers routinely entered homes without a warrant because they believed
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is limited when we consider that officers have the right to wait outside
and secure the premises until a warrant is issued.178 Thus, the suspect is
unlikely to escape.179 Also, this argument ignores the fact that warrants
can be obtained much faster with cell phones, fax machines, and various
other means. Therefore, the time argument should be less persuasive
today than it may have been one hundred years ago.180
Perhaps the timing concern reflects the idea that evidence may be
destroyed while an officer is awaiting a warrant, but the officer must
know evidence exists to create an exigency.181 Furthermore, the
Richards Court was unwilling to presume that felony drug arrests will
always be coupled with the chance that evidence will be destroyed. This
should preclude any argument that destruction of evidence in nonjailable offenses is of great concern.182
getting a warrant takes too long), cited in David A. Sklansky, Quasi-Affirmative Rights in
Constitutional Criminal Procedure, 88 VA. L. REV. 1129, 1249 n.60 (2002).
178. United States v. Grummel, 542 F.2d 789, 791 (9th Cir. 1976) (holding it was proper to
secure the premises to prevent destruction of evidence until a warrant could be obtained); Segura v.
United States, 468 U.S. 796, 798 (1984) (allowing officers to secure the premises from the inside or
the outside).
179. David A. Sklansky, The Fourth Amendment and Common Law, 100 COLUM. L. REV.
1739 (2000) (arguing recent historical approach of deciding whether a search is reasonable departs
from the Warren and Burger decisions which relied on the general aims of the Fourth Amendment).
See Rampart Incident supra note 177.
180. John Michael Harlow, Note, California v. Acevedo: The Ominous March of a Loyal Foot
Soldier, 52 LA. L. REV. 1205, 1242-43 (1992). Harlow argues that:
Many police departments can phone in warrant requests, and developing
communications technology will only quicken the warrant process. Warrants can even be
issued within one hour. Furthermore, those individuals who value their time more than
their privacy interest in a container may waive the warrant requirement and consent to an
immediate search. Of course, for those who do not consent, the police will be required to
spend some time to satisfy the warrant requirement. But, the police cannot say that their
time is too valuable to recognize a citizen’s constitutional right to a magistrate’s
approval of the search.
Id.
181. Hamrick v. State, 401 S.E.2d 25, 27 (Ga. Ct. App. 1990) (refusing to find exigent
circumstances because the officer could not have known that driver of a motorcycle was drunk so
the fact that it was later discovered cannot be a part of the assessment of whether exigent
circumstances were present).
182. Richards v. Wisconsin, 520 U.S. 385, 393 (1997). The Court stated that not every felony
drug arrest will present the threat of destruction of evidence. Id.
For example, a search could be conducted at a time when the only individuals present in
a residence have no connection with the drug activity and thus will be unlikely to
threaten officers or destroy evidence. Or the police could know that the drugs being
searched for were of a type or in a location that made them impossible to destroy
quickly. In those situations, the asserted governmental interests in preserving evidence
and maintaining safety may not outweigh the individual privacy interest . . . .
Id. Barbara C. Salken, Balancing Exigency and Privacy in Warrantless Searches to Prevent
Destruction of Evidence: The Need for a Rule, 39 HASTINGS L.J. 283 (1988) reprinted in 16 PACE
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3. Prevents Incentives to Flee
Another benefit of the bright line rule is that it removes the
incentive to flee from officers; however, the incentive is the possibility
of escape, not the additional time spent in the home while a warrant is
procured.183
A Minnesota court argued that applying Welsh too strictly would
lead to the following problem: a DUI is generally a misdemeanor, thus if
a suspect knows he is protected in his home until a warrant is obtained
he will likely attempt to flee.184 During this time, a crafty suspect could
drink alcohol rendering the results of any Breathalyzer unreliable.185
Certainly, we do not want to provide incentive to engage in high speed
chases.186 However, this argument does not justify extending hot pursuit
to all crimes, but rather only to offenses punishable by jail. Thus, there

L. REV. 37 (1997). The author described the three types of procedures used by federal courts to
determine whether destruction of evidence satisfies the exigency requirement:
(1) the “examine-avoid” approach, exemplified by courts that critically evaluate the
police officer’s assertion that an emergency exists and also require that officers avoid
warrantless action when possible; (2) the “uncritical” approach, illustrated by courts that
accept at face value the police officer’s assertion that an emergency exists and do not
affirmatively require that police avoid warrantless action although possible; and (3) the
“examine-only” approach employed by courts that critically evaluate the police officer’s
assertion that an emergency exists, but do not require that officers avoid the need for
warrantless action although possible.
Id. at 43.
183. See infra notes 203-10 and accompanying text.
184. State v. Paul, 548 N.W.2d 260, 268 (Minn. 1996). In explaining the possible
consequences of a per se rule preventing hot pursuit of misdemeanors the court stated:
The Fourth Amendment simply cannot be stretched nor can public safety be ensured by a
bright-line felony rule which would encourage drunk drivers to elude the police by
racing through the streets to the sanctuary of their homes in order to “freeze” a hot
pursuit or to otherwise evade a lawful arrest.
Id.
185. Id. at 267. The court noted that
Had Officer Gunderson not immediately entered Paul’s home, Paul’s blood alcohol level
might have dissipated while a warrant was being obtained, or Paul might have drunk
more alcohol, making a chemical test unreliable.
Id. (citing State v. Storvick, 428 N.W.2d 55, 58 (Minn. 1988), where the “defendant informed
arresting officers that ‘I drank after I got home’ in an attempt to thwart the state’s attempt to collect
evidence against him”).
186. Paul, 548 N.W.2d at 268. The court further reasoned:
Adopting a bright- line rule based on the legislature’s classification of conduct as a
misdemeanor would also sweep away any possibility that warrantless home arrests
would be justified for those misdemeanors in which the underlying conduct is serious, or
when the underlying offense is minor, but subsequent activity by the perpetrator during
his flight from the police elevates the situation to a serious one.
Id.
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seems to be little support for Flinchum’s broad holding.187
C. Balancing Test: Privacy Interest
The home has long been afforded greater protection as it is the
place for the most intimate details of our lives.188 The home is our only
refuge from the outside world. It is our safe haven and the center of our
privacy interests.189 Accordingly, this has been recognized at various
times by the Supreme Court.190
However, when courts allow warrantless home intrusions the
chances of our privacy being invaded are greater.191 This results from
circumventing the neutral magistrate, who serves to prevent
unreasonable intrusions on our privacy.192 It is clear that increasing the

187. State v. Flinchum, 765 N.E.2d 330, 332 (Ohio 2002) (holding hot pursuit will justify a
warrantless entry regardless of the underlying offense). See supra notes 129-44 and accompanying
text discussing how the Ohio Supreme Court should have considered the severity of punishment in
determining exigent circumstances.
188. See supra notes 1-5 and accompanying text. See also Rich Jefferson, Federal Judge
Delivers Major Opinion Supporting Sanctity of Family Home, Home School Legal Defense
Association, available at http://www.hslda.org/docs/nes/hslda/199701080.asp (Jan. 8, 1997)
(discussing improper searches with regard to reports of child abuse).
189. Hafetz, supra note 136 (providing a review of the court’s treatment of the home during
the 18th and 19th century, and how the concept of “a man’s home is his castle” has provided an
unmanageable standard for the courts). Privacy is a widely held right throughout the world. See 79
C.J.S. Searches and Seizures § 32 (2002) (defining the home with regard to the constitutional
protections offered).
190. William C. Heffernan, Fourth Amendment Privacy Interests, 92 J. CRIM. L. &
CRIMINOLOGY 1 (2002) (discussing the Supreme Court’s conservative approach to interpretations of
privacy); Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 482-86 (1965) (discussing the various ways in
which privacy is incorporated into our Constitution).
191. See supra notes 6-12 and accompanying text. Daniel J. Solove, Conceptualizing Privacy,
90 CAL L. REV. 1087 (2002) (providing an analysis of historical approaches to discussing privacy
and arguing for a pragmatic approach to determining privacy). The right to privacy can be infringed
upon in other domains. Amitai Etzioni, The Right to Privacy vs. the Common Good, U.S.A. TODAY
MAGAZINE Sept. 2000, available at http://www.gwu.edu/~ccps/etzioni/B338.html (last visited Feb.
9, 2003) (discussing drug testing as a violation of the right to privacy from philosophical
approaches); Jessica Reaves, Does a Sex Offender Have a Right to Privacy?, available at
http://www.cnn.com/2000/US/04/20/megan4_20.a.tm/index.html (last visited April 20, 2000)
(discussing how certain State laws dealing with the reporting of sex offenders may infringe on the
offenders’ right to privacy).
192. Johnson v. United States, 333 U.S. 10, 13-14 (1948). In discussing the rationale behind
their decision the Court noted:
The point of the Fourth Amendment, which often is not grasped by zealous officers, is
not that it denies law enforcement the support of the usual inferences which reasonable
men draw from evidence. Its protection consists in requiring that those inferences be
drawn by a neutral and detached magistrate instead of being judged by the officer
engaged in the often competitive enterprise of ferreting out crime.
Id.
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number of exceptions to the warrant rule will affect our right to privacy
in our homes.193 The Flinchum holding leaves open the possibility that
an officer may break down the door of any home if he or she is in hot
pursuit and reasonably believes the suspect is inside.194
When we analyze the Ohio Supreme Court’s approach we see that a
limited increase in benefits occurs, but the overly broad holding
disproportionately increases potential consequences, as well.195
Therefore it cannot be said that the government interest outweighs the
right to privacy, regardless of the underlying offense.196
D. Consequences of Flinchum
1. Erosion of Fourth Amendment Principles of Reasonableness
The Flinchum decision grants another exception to the knock-andannounce rule.197 The knock-and-announce rule ensures that a search
193. Welsh v. Wisconsin, 466 U.S. 740, 748 (1984) (stating that “a principal protection against
unnecessary intrusions into private dwellings is the warrant requirement imposed by the Fourth
Amendment on agents of the government who seek to enter the home for purposes of search or
arrest”).
194. See supra notes 114-21 and accompanying text discussing the Ohio Supreme Court’s
reasoning in State v. Flinchum.
195. See the Ohio Supreme Court’s reasoning at supra notes 114-21 and accompanying text.
See Charles Hellman, Note, Secure in Their Houses? Fourth Amendment Rights at Public Housing
Projects, 40 N.Y. L. SCH. L. REV. 189 (1995). The author discussed the great amount of violence
in Chicago Public Housing, which prompted “Operation Clean Sweep.” Id. at 189-90. This
operation allowed officers to enter each building in an effort to curb the violence and tensions,
regardless of whether permission was given or if the resident was home. Id. at 190. In August
1995, “Operation Clean Sweep” was banned as it was found to violate the Fourth Amendment. Id.
at 190-91.
196. See supra notes 163-87 and accompanying text discussing potential benefits from the rule
announced in Flinchum. The proposed benefits from applying the hot pursuit doctrine to all crimes
regardless of the underlying offense seem to be illusory and disproportionately increases the
consequences without increasing the benefits. Id.
197. OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2935.12 (Anderson 2003) provides:
When making an arrest or executing an arrest warrant or summons in lieu of an arrest
warrant, or when executing a search warrant, the peace officer, law enforcement officer,
or other authorized individual making the arrest or executing the arrest or summons may
break down an outer or inner door or window of a dwelling house or other building, if
after notice of his intention to make the arrest or to execute the warrant or summons, he
is refused admittance . . . .
Id. Bryan Murray, Note, After United States v. Vaneaton, Does Payton v. New York Prevent Police
From Making Warrantless Routine Arrests Inside the Home?, 26 GOLDEN GATE U. L. REV. 135,
135-36 (1996). “[T]he Ninth Circuit held that police did not violate the Fourth Amendment . . . by
making a warrantless arrest of a suspect who answered his door in response to their knock.” Id. at
135. “In so holding, the Ninth Circuit ignored the firm line drawn in Payton by allowing a
warrantless entry into a dwelling so long as police use no coercion and announce the arrest before
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will be reasonable; however, Flinchum fails to provide any assurance of
reasonableness.198 The Ohio Supreme Court attempted to minimize its
decision in the opinion’s closing sentence, which claims that officers do
not have unbridled authority to disregard the Fourth Amendment.199
Unfortunately, applications of Flinchum show otherwise. For
example, in State v. Stuber, police officers approached Stuber in his
driveway and stated they had a bench warrant for a minor traffic
offense.200 Stuber then entered his residence and locked the doors but
officers forced the door open and arrested him.201 The Ohio appellate
court relied on Flinchum in upholding the officer’s actions, thus showing
officers have the power to disregard the warrant requirement anytime

stepping inside.” Id. at 136
198. Richards v. Wisconsin, 520 U.S. 385, 394 (1997). In reviewing the Wisconsin Supreme
Court’s blanket exception to the knock and announce rule in drug cases, the Court stated that in
“each case, it is the duty of a court confronted with the question to determine whether the facts and
circumstances of the particular entry justified dispensing with the knock-and-announce
requirement.” Id. See also Randall S. Bethune, Note, The Exclusionary Rule and the Knock-andAnnounce Violation: Unreasonable Remedy for an Otherwise Reasonable Search Warrant
Execution, 22 WHITIER L. REV. 879 (2001). The author recognized the importance of the
requirement by stating:
It is a long-standing principle in society and in law that a man’s home is his domain,
providing both security and sanctity. Our law honors that notion by prohibiting
government officials from entering one’s home without a warrant approved by a
magistrate. Even when government officials possess a valid search or arrest warrant, the
law underscores the importance of the right to privacy in the home by requiring
government officials to knock and announce their presence and purpose.
Id. at 879. Mark Josephson, Fourth Amendment: Must Police Knock and Announce Themselves
Before Kicking in the Door of a House?, 86 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 1229, 1235-38 (1996)
(discussing how the framers were in general agreement that the knock-and-announce requirement
was an important part of their English heritage).
199. State v. Flinchum, 765 N.E.2d 330, 332 (Ohio 2002) (stating that “[i]n so holding, we do
not give law enforcement unbridled authority to enter a suspect’s residence at whim or with blatant
disregard for the constraints of the Fourth Amendment, but rather limited to situations present in
today’s case”). Goddard, supra note 29, at 462 (finding that “early common-law exceptions
involved either imminent bodily danger to the officers or the suspect’s knowledge of an officer’s
presence and purpose,” therefore “early American courts . . . narrowly construed the type of exigent
circumstances that would constitute exceptions to the knock and announce rule”), cited in Maclin,
supra note 30, at 914 n.76 (discussing the history of the Fourth Amendment and recent Supreme
Court cases dealing with history).
200. State v. Stuber, No. 1-02-20, 2002 WL 31618993, at *1 (Ohio Ct. App. 3d Dist. Nov. 21,
2002).
201. Id. Lisa Ruddy, Note & Comment, From Seat Belts to Handcuffs: May Police Arrest for
Minor Traffic Violations?, 10 AM. U.J. GENDER SOC. POL’Y & L. 479 (2002). “[T]wenty-eight
states permit a police officer to place otherwise law-abiding citizens under full custodial arrest.” Id.
at 479. See Wayne A. Logan, Street Legal: The Court Affords Police Constitutional Carte Blanche,
77 IND. L.J. 419 (2002) (discussing the Atwater v. Lago Vista case and its relation to arrests for
minor offenses).
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their authority is ignored.202
2. Police Misconduct
The Ohio Supreme Court’s reasoning assumes that innocent people
do not run from the police. This ignores the severe racial problems
associated with law enforcement203 and the great deal of fear associated
with arrest.204 Certainly race problems are not foreign to Ohio. For
example, Cincinnati erupted in protests after the shooting of Timothy
Thomas in April 2001.205 Thomas was being pursued for several
misdemeanor violations and was shot unarmed.206 Furthermore, it is
202. Stuber, 2002 WL 31618993, at *3. The court declined to determine whether the officer’s
entry was reasonable under O.R.C. 2935.12(A), which requires officers to knock-and-announce
prior to forcing there way into a home. Id. at *2.
203. Lewis Katz, Anti-Terrorism Laws: Too Much of a Good Thing, available at
http://jurist.law.pitt.edu/forum/forumnew39.htm (last visited November 24, 2001) (discussing the
Fourth Amendment in the wake of September 11, 2001); William J. Stuntz, Local Policing after the
Terror, 111 YALE L.J. 2137, 2179 (2002). Even those who regard racial or ethnic profiling as
occasionally tolerable must agree that it is a very bad thing. Id. It depends on the balance of the
benefits to law enforcement from using race as a proxy and the harm to the group affected by the
profiling. Id Consequently, police are likely to take race and ethnicity into account even when
doing so is socially harmful. Id. One is left with a world in which a lot of profiling is both socially
destructive and impossible to prevent. Id. Timothy P. O’Neill, Beyond Privacy, Beyond Probable
Cause, Beyond the Fourth Amendment: New Strategies for Fighting Pretext Arrests, 69 U. COLO. L.
REV. 693 (1998) (discussing use of minor traffic violations as a pretext for otherwise invalid
searches and seizures). See also Matthew S. Crider, Note, Criminal Procedure—Searches and
Seizures—Police Officers Must Meet “Reasonable Officer” Standard to Withstand Pretext Claim,
36 S. TEX. L. REV. 629 (1995) (discussing the modified objective or the reasonable officer approach
with respect to pretext cases).
204. Schroeder, supra note 130, at 798-801. Discussing the great fear associated with arrest:
A custodial arrest is an especially “awesome and frightening” experience. The arrestee
is abruptly constrained and usually searched, even if the arrest is for a minor offense. He
is then forcibly taken to an unfamiliar place, booked, fingerprinted, photographed,
searched more extensively, and held in jail, possibly under unsanitary and unsafe
conditions, until, and unless, he can obtain his release. The arrestee may suffer emotional
distress and public humiliation, and may lose contact with family and friends. He may
lose time from work and will probably be required to retain an attorney and spend money
on bail. If the detention is at all prolonged, he may lose his job or suffer other adverse
consequences. If a person charged with a misdemeanor is subjected to a custodial arrest,
that arrest is likely to be the major consequence suffered by that person.
Id.
205. Andrew E. Taslitz, Stories of Fourth Amendment Disrespect: from Elian to the Internment
70 FORDHAM L. REV. 2257, 2257 (2002) (claiming “the shooting sparked protests in Cincinnati’s
African-American community, as protesters alleged that the officers used excessive force because of
Thomas’s race”) (citing Francis X. Clines, In Aftershock of Unrest, Cincinnati Seeks Answers, N.Y.
TIMES, Apr. 23, 2001, at A11 (suggesting protests partly sparked by concerns that the Thomas
shooting was the latest in a long line of excessive force cases)).
206. Taslitz, supra note 205 (noting that Thomas was the fourth black male killed since 1995
and that no white suspects had been shot during the same period).
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very common to experience fear when one is being arrested. In fact, a
black social worker cited for speeding is now petrified every time she
sees a police car in her rearview mirror.207 She stated, “[i]n that one
brief encounter, her entire sense of herself— her job, the fact that she is
a mother and an educated, law-abiding person working on a master’s
degree—was stripped away.”208 A forty-one year old black male who
was consistently pulled over by police put it best: “[t]hey have the power
and they can do whatever they want to do to you for that period of
time . . . . You’re never beyond this, because of the color of your skin.”
209
The fear associated with arrest is not limited to blacks, but rather is
generally experienced by all minorities.210
It is no secret that our society deals with police corruption and
abuse on a daily basis.211 In 1931, a National Commission found
extensive evidence of police lawlessness, including unnecessary
violence.212 In 1961, the U.S. Commission on Civil Rights found that
police brutality is a serious and continuing problem.213 Most recently
207. Id. at 2260. Suzanne Leone, Massachusetts Addresses Racial Profiling Head On: The
Efficiency of Chapter 228 of the Acts and Resolves of 2000, 28 NEW ENG. J. ON CRIM. & CIV.
CONFINEMENT 335 (2002) (discussing how the Massachusetts Legislature is dealing with racial
profiling). Alberto B. Lopez, Racial Profiling and Whren: Searching for Objective Evidence of the
Fourth Amendment on the Nation’s Roads, 90 KY. L.J. 75 (2002) (discussing recent Presidential
concern over racial profiling and Congressional pressures to solve this problem).
208. Taslitz, supra note 205, at 2260 (citing KENNETH MEEKS, DRIVING WHILE BLACK:
HIGHWAYS, SHOPPING MALLS, TAXICABS, SIDEWALKS: HOW TO FIGHT BACK IF YOU ARE A
VICTIM OF RACIAL PROFILING 3-20, 63-157 (2000)). Statistics taken from major Ohio cities
including Toledo, Akron, Cleveland, and Columbus, have shown that blacks are twice as likely to
be ticketed than whites. David A. Harris, The Stories, the Statistics, and the Law: Why “Driving
While Black” Matters, 84 MINN. L. REV. 265, 266-67 (1999).
209. Taslitz, supra note 205, at 2260 (citing Harris, supra note 208, at 272-73 quoting
Interview by David Harris with Michael in Toledo, Ohio (Oct. 1, 1998)). See Devon W. Carbado,
(E)racing the Fourth Amendment, 100 MICH. L. REV. 946 (2002) (providing an in depth look at
race and its relation to the Fourth Amendment).
210. See Theodore W. Maya, Comment, To Serve and Protect or to Betray and Neglect? The
LAPD and Undocumented Immigrants, 49 UCLA L. REV. 1611 (2002) (explaining the problems
experienced by immigrants in Los Angeles, California).
211. Hess, supra note 10, at 150 (finding that while a certain level of abuse exists, the public is
hesitant to picture the abused as victims). See also Tracey L. Meares, Praying for Community
Policing, 90 CAL. L. REV. 1593 (2002) (providing an alternative to traditional methods of police
operation).
212. NATIONAL COMM’N ON LAW OBSERVANCE AND ENFORCEMENT, REPORT ON
LAWLESSNESS IN LAW ENFORCEMENT 153-56 (1931), reprinted in THE THIRD DEGREE: MASS
VIOLENCE IN AMERICA (Zechariah Chafee, Jr. et al. eds., 1969). See Harold A. Mcdougall, For
Critical Race Practitioners: RACE, RACISM AND AMERICAN LAW (4th Ed.) By Derrick A. Bell, Jr., 46
HOW. L.J. 1 (2002) (summarizing the arguments in the civil rights case book RACE, RACISM, AND
AMERICAN LAW).
213. U.S. COMM’N ON CIVIL RIGHTS, 1961 COMMISSION ON CIVIL RIGHTS REPORT, BOOK V.
JUSTICE 26 (1961). See Richard S. Frase, What Were They Thinking? Fourth Amendment
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the U.S. General Accounting Office noted that various sources have
recommended independent federal monitors to prevent police
corruption.214 As we have seen, the rule announced in Flinchum allows
police to circumvent various Fourth Amendment protections.215
Additionally, increases in police power are likely to escalate the number
of Section 1983 lawsuits filed against law enforcement.216
3. Danger to Third Parties
In Flinchum, the officers were not sure what residence Flinchum
entered until they viewed him standing in the kitchen. The officers
could not have known whether the house belonged to Flinchum or to a
Unreasonableness in Atwater v. City of Lago Vista, 71 FORDHAM L. REV. 329 (2002) (arguing that
broad arrest power creates the potential for police abuse because of the large amount of traffic
laws).
214. Jenny Rivera, Extra! Extra! Read All About it: What a Plaintiff “Knows or Should Know”
Based on Officials’ Statements and Media Coverage of Police Misconduct for Notice of a § 1983
Municipal Liability Claim, 28 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 505, 506 (2000). As investigative committees
have identified and highlighted the link between police corruption and police brutality, requests for
external controls have increased. Indeed, calls for independent federal monitors in cases of police
brutality reflect the dissatisfaction with, and intolerance of, police misconduct and abuse, as well as
the growing recognition that local police departments do not or cannot police themselves.
Id. (citing U.S. Gen. Accounting Office, GAO Report, Law Enforcement: Information on DrugRelated Police Corruption: Report to the Honorable Charles B. Rangel, House of Representatives
(1998) (noting that various sources have recommended external oversight of police departments)).
See also Jennifer E. Koepke, The Failure to Breach the Blue Wall of Silence: The Circling of the
Wagons to Protect Police Perjury, 39 Washburn L.J. 211, 221 (2000) (discussing the rise of police
perjury associated with police corruption). Craig M. Bradley, Two Models of the Fourth
Amendment, 83 Mich. L. Rev. 1468 (1985) (providing two theoretical models to approach the
Fourth Amendment analysis of police conduct in searches and seizures).
215. See supra notes 134-38 and accompanying text discussing the need to consider the
underlying offense in determining exigent circumstances. See supra notes 197-202 and
accompanying text discussing the knock-and-announce requirement. See infra note 217 and
accompanying text discussing the need for a warrant before entering the home of a third party. See
Skinner, supra note 9 (discussing how New Jersey Courts have weakened the Fourth Amendment
protections by allowing officers to enter a home without knocking and announcing when they have
an arrest warrant regardless of the underlying offense); Driscoll, supra note 10, at 2 (discussing
exception to the knock-and-announce rule has created a disturbing pattern of police raids);
Fernandez, supra note 133, at 837 (stating that “[i]n creating an “easily administrable” rule for
warrantless misdemeanor arrests, the instant Court has paved the path to police abuse by affording
law enforcement officials unlimited discretion”).
216. See Thorne Clark, Protection from Protection: Section 1983 and the ADA’s Implications
for Devising a Race-Conscious Police Misconduct Statute, 150 U. PA. L. REV. 1585 (2002)
(discussing the life of Henry Dumas, a black author, who was slain by a mistaken N.Y. police
officer). Goins, supra note 68 (discussing the liability of law enforcement officers when conducting
warrantless home entries); See generally Hess, supra note 10 (discussing remedies available for
police conduct); William J. Stuntz, Terrorism, Federalism, and Police Misconduct, 25 HARV. J.L. &
PUB. POL’Y 665 (2002) (analyzing police problems in relation to the control of law enforcement on
the state and federal level).
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third party. 217 Perhaps Flinchum ran into his grandfather’s house. One
can only imagine the terror if police kicked down the door and
entered.218 Assuming Flinchum did run into the home of a third party,
the U.S. Supreme Court in Steagald requires police to obtain a search
warrant in order to enter the premises in the absence of exigent
circumstances.219
Age can also be a factor leading to fleeing arrest. For example,
imagine that your teenager consumes alcohol under the age of twentyone.220 Upon seeing a police officer, your child, like most children, runs
into the house even though the officer yells “Stop.”221 Upon witnessing
the child enter your home the officer quickly breaks down the door and
throws your fifteen-year-old down to the ground and cuffs him.222 The
officer has done nothing wrong under Flinchum because your child
committed a crime and fled an otherwise lawful arrest.223
The consequences of such action are grave because it puts officers’
lives in danger, citizens’ lives in danger, and further erodes our Fourth
Amendment rights.224 The Ohio Supreme Court failed to realize that
there are often innocent people inside homes who may become injured
as a door is kicked in or if shots are fired.225 In the preceeding example
217. State v. Flinchum, 765 N.E.2d 330, 331 (Ohio 2002) (“As the pursuit continued, Officer
Birch heard a rear screen door slam open on a house that was later determined to be appellant’s.
The officer then observed appellant standing in his kitchen five feet inside his home.”). Taslitz,
supra note 205 (providing stories of police misconduct and its effect on others).
218. See, e.g., James Bovard, No-Knock Entries by Police Take Their Toll on Innocent,
CHRISTIAN SCIENCE MONITOR, May 24, 1994, at 18; Christopher Reed, Drugs: Innocent People
Dying in Brutal War, CALGARY HERALD, Nov. 18, 1993, at A5; Bob Ross, War on Drugs Takes
Toll on Innocent, USA TODAY, Jan. 11, 1993, at 1A.
219. Steagald v. United States, 451 U.S. 204, 222 (1981) (holding exigent circumstances are
necessary to enter the home of a third party even if probable cause is present). This is
distinguishable from Flinchum because the underlying offense is relatively minor. One should note
that officers relying on statutes to enter the home without a warrant are not necessarily protected
from a 1983 federal action. Bell, supra note 45 (discussing potential liability for officers under
Utah law).
220. Underage consumption is a misdemeanor in Ohio under OHIO REV. CODE ANN. §
4301.631 (Anderson 2003).
221. Compare this example to the facts in Flinchum, supra notes 85-97 and accompanying text.
222. In State v. Stuber, No. 1-02-20, 2002 WL 31618993, at *2 (Ohio Ct. App. 3d Dist. Nov.
21, 2002), the appellate court refused to consider whether the officers’ method of entry was
reasonable as it was lawful under Flinchum.
223. State v. Flinchum, 765 N.E.2d 330, 332 (Ohio 2002) (holding “when officers, having
identified themselves, are in hot pursuit of a suspect who flees to a house in order to avoid arrest,
the police may enter without a warrant, regardless of whether the offense for which the suspect is
being arrested is a misdemeanor”).
224. Driscoll, supra note 10, at 2.
225. Id. at 28. Arguing:
[T]he particularized approach limits no-knock entries only to those cases in which a need
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there could have been children near the door as it came crashing in, not
to mention an elderly family member witnessing this horrific event.226
In 1989, Florida police threw flash grenades into the home of a
sixteen-year-old boy suspected of dealing drugs.227 Confused, the boy’s
father pulled out a pistol and began to fire at the incoming officers.228 In
Dorchester, Massachusetts, a seventy-five-year-old retired minister died
of a heart attack after a police SWAT unit mistakenly broke down the
door and entered his apartment, unannounced, in a search for illegal
drugs.229 Some may argue that the U.S. Supreme Court will not uphold
such a blatant disregard for human rights; however, the Supreme Court
in Atwater v. Lago Vista merely stated that the officer used poor
judgment when, in front of her children, he decided to arrest, cuff,
search, and take a woman to jail for a mere seatbelt violation.230
4. Problems Associated with Quick Decision Making
One of the benefits of the warrant requirement is that the inherent
passage of time in obtaining a warrant allows tension to subside. Thus,
police are less likely to enter the premises in a forceful, violent manner,
reducing the chance of police brutality.231 Even in the absence of police
corruption law enforcement errors are likely to be made, and thus we
should provide a buffer zone to prevent further harm.232
for such an entry can be demonstrated with reference to facts particular to the entry in
question. By permitting no-knock entries only when there is specific evidence that
destruction of evidence is otherwise likely, the particularized approach restrains law
enforcement officers from making unexpected searches. Thus, this approach maximizes
the virtues of the knock-and-announce principle: protection of privacy; avoidance of
violence or destruction of property resulting from surprise police entries; and prevention
of “arbitrary invasions by governmental officials.”
Id.
226. See supra notes 220-22 and accompanying text.
227. Joe Hallinan, Gestapo-like Tactics Used in Drug Raids, DES MOINES REGISTER, Nov. 6,
1993, at 2, cited in Driscoll, supra note 10, at 5.
228. Id.
229. Toni Locy, Confidence in Informant May Have Hastened Raid, BOSTON GLOBE, Apr. 2,
1994, at 19, cited in Driscoll, supra note 10, at 5.
230. See supra notes 140-41 and accompanying text.
231. See Simien, supra note 15, at 524 (stating that “the Constitution, which may not be
changed in the ordinary process, was intended to be a buffer against the injustices caused by the
swayable passions of the majority”).
232. Brady, supra note 25, at 21. The article presented some of the problems with allowing
warrantless arrests of misdemeanors:
The state arrest laws, particularly those authorizing warrantless arrests, have at least
three immediate consequences. First, the use of warrants for arrest becomes the
exception, rather than the rule. Second, the blanket authority of police officers to
conduct arrests for misdemeanors without warrants undoubtedly results in far more
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In Almeida-Sanchez v. United States,233 the U.S. Supreme Court
stated, “[t]he needs of law enforcement stand in constant tension with
the Constitution’s protections of the individual against certain exercises
of official power. It is precisely the predictability of these pressures that
counsels a resolute loyalty to constitutional safeguards.”234 This article
is not meant to portray police officers as bigots and racists in a common
pursuit to deprive Americans of civil liberties. In fact, it should be noted
that the law enforcement occupation throughout the world suffers from a
great deal of stress.235 Furthermore, in the wake of September 11th,
Americans developed a much needed respect for law enforcement
officials. It is clear, however, that decisions concerning the Fourth
Amendment are better left to a neutral and detached magistrate.236
Unfortunately, Flinchum grants law enforcement the power to make
decisions previously delegated to a neutral magistrate.237

arrests than if a “cooling off” period occurred between the alleged criminal incident and
the arrest. The Fourth Amendment anticipates the benefit of that interim period— that a
neutral, detached judicial officer will intervene to determine whether probable cause
exists for an arrest. Third, such broad police authority coupled with operational stresses
in the court systems effectively removes the buffer between the government and the
individuals that the Framers intended the Fourth Amendment to provide.
Id. However, some argue that interpretations of the Fourth Amendment rulings such as Flinchum
are needed to facilitate effective law enforcement. Skinner, supra note 9, at 1747 (arguing hot
pursuit of the subject of a warrant is needed in order to prevent hampering of police duties);
Haberle, supra note 177, at 895 (arguing that a strict application of the exclusionary rule will
prevent effective law enforcement).
233. 413 U.S. 266 (1973).
234. Id. at 273. Bruce T. Moats, Search & Seizure—The Clash Between the Fourth
Amendment and Society’s Interest in Effective Law Enforcement, 30 LAND & WATER L. REV. 253,
270 (1995) (discussing the balancing test courts must engage in when deciding Fourth Amendment
issues) (quoting Almeida-Sanchez, 413 U.S. at 273).
235. Jennifer Brown et al., Occupational Stress Among Senior Police Officers, BRIT. J.
PSYCHOL. 31 (Vol. 87 No. 1 1996), available at 1996 WL 10400274 (finding police officers in
Britain and Germany and various other countries suffer from high levels of stress).
236. Logan, supra note 14, at 1292. The court’s purpose is to act as a buffer which gives effect
to the rights enumerated in the Constitution. Id. Daniel L. Rotenberg, On Seizures and Searches, 28
CREIGHTON L. REV. 323 (1995) (discussing modifications for judicial and police approaches to
search and seizures). See also William F. Brown & Americo R. Cinquegrana, Warrantless Physical
Searches for Foreign Intelligence Purposes: Executive Order 12,333 and the Fourth Amendment,
35 CATH. U. L. REV. 97 (1985) (discussing foreign intelligence exceptions to the warrant rule).
Corey Fleming Hirokawa, Making the “Law of the Land” the Law on the Street: How Police
Academies Teach Evolving Fourth Amendment Law, 49 EMORY L.J. 295 (2000) (providing an
analysis of Atlanta police academies’ practices in presenting criminal procedure requirements set by
the courts).
237. See State v. Flinchum, 765 N.E.2d 330, 332 (Ohio 2002). It seems that prior to Flinchum
officers would have obtained a warrant prior to entering the home.

http://ideaexchange.uakron.edu/akronlawreview/vol37/iss3/3

38

Vaughn: Middletown v. Flinchum
VAUGHAN1.DOC

2004]

4/19/2004 10:25 AM

MIDDLETOWN V. FLINCHUM

547

V. CONCLUSION
It seems clear the Ohio Supreme Court’s ruling in Flinchum was
overly broad. The consequences of such a ruling can be very harsh. As
discussed, the ruling gives Ohio law enforcement officers a great deal of
power, and with such power comes the increased risk of abuse.
Furthermore, the types of entries allowed under this holding
unnecessarily endanger the lives of innocent third parties and may also
cause unnecessary property damage. Additionally, Flinchum will likely
increase the number of Section 1983 lawsuits. These lawsuits may cause
a financial strain on the state government.
The benefits of Flinchum appear to be negligible because it is quite
easy for an officer to obtain a warrant. The concept of defeating an
otherwise lawful arrest thus seems misleading. The only benefit is that
an officer saves the time it would have taken to get a warrant. Some
benefit may be seen in allowing swift law enforcement, but this has
never been a top priority. The warrant was created to prevent
unreasonable government intrusions, thus fostering the right of privacy.
In fact, the creation of the warrant requirement suggests this privacy
interest is greater than the need for swift law enforcement action. By
allowing hot pursuit to suffice as an exigent circumstance regardless of
the underlying offense, the court has failed to give sufficient weight to
the right of privacy.
Individuals run from police for a variety of reasons, but the court
seems to assume only the guilty flee. This assumption causes an error in
the balancing of the governmental interest and the individual right to
privacy. In order to correct this error the court must recognize two
things. First, when there is no threat of jail time the inducement to run is
likely to be low, and thus when it happens it is likely due to other factors
such as fear or distrust of law enforcement. Second, when a jailable
offense is involved the motive to run is increased by the chance of
escaping jail, not seeking temporary refuge in a home. Finally, when
society decides to impose a jail sentence they have decided the act in
question requires a deprivation in freedom, presumably the balancing
scales tip in favor of the government when pursuing those likely to have
committed such offenses. Thus, a warrant may not be required. No
rational generalization exists for non-jailable offenses. Utilizing these
principles creates a distinction between non-jailable and jailable
offenses, which is sufficient justification for allowing hot pursuit of only
the latter.
In conclusion, the gravest danger of Flinchum is future extensions

Published by IdeaExchange@UAkron, 2004

39

Akron Law Review, Vol. 37 [2004], Iss. 3, Art. 3
VAUGHAN1.DOC

548

4/19/2004 10:25 AM

AKRON LAW REVIEW

[37:509

of the holding. It is well known that our Fourth Amendment rights have
been increasingly eroded over the years. In order to prevent inaccurate
interpretations of such cases it is vital that courts rule in a narrow
fashion. The Ohio Supreme Court failed to take such precautions and
has taken a large chunk out of our Fourth Amendment rights in a very
unpersuasive two-page opinion.
Nathan Vaughan
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